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BEHAVIORAL LEGAL ETHICS 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers’ ethical improprieties2 are frequently the subject of jokes,3 
movies,4 public opinion surveys,5 disciplinary filings,6 and news stories. 
Open a recent newspaper or check your favorite website and you may see 
stories about attorneys failing to investigate (let alone discipline) alleged 
                                                                                                                            
1. Robbennolt is Professor of Law and Psychology, University of Illinois. Sternlight is 
Saltman Professor and Director Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas Boyd School of Law. The paper is an expanded version of a chapter in our book, 
PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, 
LITIGATION AND DECISION MAKING (2012). We thank Michael Kagan, Kate Kruse, Jeff Meyer, 
Nancy Rapoport, Arden Rowell, Bill Stempel, Jeff Stempel, Nina Tarr, and participants at the 
ABA Dispute Resolution Section Annual Meeting, the Yale-Quinnipiac Dispute Resolution 
Workshop, and Vanderbilt Law School for their helpful comments. We thank Patrick Beisell, 
Jessica Bregant, Jhaniel James, Geordan Logan, Sarah Mead, and David Schnell-Davis for their 
research assistance. 
2. When we discuss lawyers’ “ethics” we refer not only to compliance with the formal 
professional rules of ethics and other relevant statutory provisions, but also to behavior that is 
consistent with one’s own moral compass. 
3. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, What Do Lawyer Jokes Tell Us About Lawyers and 
Lawyering, 23 CORNELL L.F. 3, 3 (1996); Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of 
Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 816 (1998); 
Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF. L. 
REV. 379, 379 (1987); Robert E. Scott, The Lawyer as Public Citizen, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 733, 
733 (2000).  
4. See, e.g., THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE (Regency Enterprises 1997) (portraying an attorney 
who is offered a job by a high profile law firm run by the devil); LIAR LIAR (Universal Pictures 
1997) (portraying a successful attorney who is forced to be truthful for twenty-four hours); 
RUNAWAY JURY (Regency Enterprises 2003) (portraying litigation involving an unethical jury 
consultant). 
5. See, e.g., Gary A. Hengstler & R. William Ide III, Vox Populi; The Public Perception 
of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79 A.B.A. J. 60 (1993); David W. Moore, Nurses Top List in Honesty 
and Ethics Poll, GALLUP NEWS SERV. (Dec. 7, 2004), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14236/nurses-top-list-honesty-ethics-poll.aspx (placing lawyers 
nineteenth of twenty-one professions with respect to honesty and ethical standards); Sarah 
Parikh, Public Perceptions of Lawyers: Consumer Research Findings, 2002 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 
8, 18, available at http://www.cliffordlaw.com/abaillinoisstatedelegate/publicperceptions1.pdf.  
6. See, e.g., A.B.A. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP., 2010 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE 
SYSTEMS (S.O.L.D.) 1–35 (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2010_s
old_finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf (collecting statistics relating to attorney discipline). 
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child abusers,7 allowing corporate employers to pay illegal bribes8 or 
commit fraudulent acts,9 hiding or destroying evidence,10 lying in 
negotiations,11 mishandling prosecutions,12 or representing clients in the 
                                                                                                                            
7. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 225, 247–54 (2006) (discussing role of church attorneys in defending Catholic priests 
accused of sexual misconduct); Michael Rubinkam, Testimony at Sandusky Trial Shows Missed 
Chances, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2012, 1:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-
wires/20120616/us-penn-state-abuse-under-their-noses (describing district attorney’s decision 
not to charge Jerry Sandusky over a 1998 molestation allegation). 
8. See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed up by Walmart After Top-Level 
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at A1; cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394–
95 (1981) (discussing Upjohn Company’s self-report to the Internal Revenue Service about 
questionable payments by a subsidiary to a foreign government). 
9. See, e.g., Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at app. C, In re 
Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG), 2003 WL 25544836 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003), 
available at http://www.concernedshareholders.com/CCS_ENRON_Report.pdf (finding 
“sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that certain of Enron’s attorneys . . 
. aided and abetted the Enron officers’ breaches of fiduciary duty”). See generally NANCY B. 
RAPOPORT ET AL., ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER 
(2d ed. 2009); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1167, 1170–71 (2005) (describing role of Enron attorneys); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality 
of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 985 
(2005).  
10. See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05CV1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 
66932, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (discussing attorneys’ failure to produce 46,000 “critical” 
documents in a major lawsuit); Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., No. 
CA 03-5045 A1, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (granting default judgment to 
plaintiff on ground that attorneys for Morgan Stanley egregiously failed to produce requested 
computer disk drives); OFF. OF PROF’L RESP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF 
ALLEGATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN UNITED STATES V. THEODORE F. STEVENS, 
CRIM. NO. 08-231 (D.D.C. 2009) (EGS) (2011), available at 
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/052412-081511Report.pdf (detailing investigation 
into alleged prosecutorial misconduct); Walter Kiechel III, The Strange Case of Kodak’s 
Lawyers, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 188 (describing failure to turn over a suitcase containing 
documents relied upon by expert witness). 
11. See, e.g., Art Hinshaw et al., Attorneys and Negotiation Ethics: A Material 
Misunderstanding?, 29 NEGOT. J. 265 (2013) (reporting that a substantial minority of practicing 
attorneys engaged in unethical or even fraudulent behavior in experimental settings); Art 
Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Attorney Negotiation 
Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 148 (2011) (finding that attorneys are willing to violate 
the requirements of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 governing legal 
negotiations). 
12. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 183–86 (2007); Duff Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Is 
Disbarred for Ethics Breaches, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/us/16cnd-nifong.html; cf. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. 
Ct. 1350, 1355 (2011) (finding that although prosecutor’s office failed to disclose an 
exculpatory crime report, plaintiff failed to make sufficient showing of “deliberate indifference” 
for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See generally Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the 
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face of seemingly obvious conflicts of interest.13 By perusing bar 
disciplinary records one would also learn about a myriad of less 
newsworthy but nonetheless important ethical violations—failure to 
communicate with clients, neglect of client matters, failure to provide 
competent representation, and misuse of client trust funds.14 Whether one is 
most concerned with some lawyers’ failure to comply with even minimal 
ethical rules, or whether one advocates that lawyers hold themselves to 
higher standards, one will likely be disturbed by such reports.15 
A survey by the American Bar Association found that 118,054 ethics 
complaints were made against U.S. lawyers in 2010.16 Of course, such 
                                                                                                                            
Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (2011). 
13. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 
1–12 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2004) (discussing attorney who was sentenced to prison for making 
false affidavits hiding conflict of interest). In addition, one might identify more politically 
controversial examples. See Patrick Gavin, PBS Documentary Looks at Bill Clinton’s Career, 
POLITICO (Jan. 1, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71382.html 
(reviewing documentary discussing President Clinton’s sexual dalliances and his subsequent 
dishonesty regarding those dalliances). See generally David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of 
Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007); see also W. Bradley Wendel, 
Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror: The 2008 F.W. Wickwire Memorial Lecture, 31 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 247, 265 (2009) (urging that the arguments relied upon by Bush administration 
attorneys to justify harsh inquisition tactics were so far outside the range of reasonable as to be 
considered unethical). 
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) (concerning Client-Lawyer 
Relationship); see Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of 
Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 259–60 (2012) (reporting that the most 
common disciplinary complaints made against attorneys involve neglect and lack of 
communication); Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The 
Everyday Ethics of Defense Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 754 (1998) (“It is difficult to 
comprehend and define the extraordinary violations without understanding the ordinary ethical 
issues that practicing lawyers routinely confront and resolve in their everyday professional life. 
Focusing on the tail of the distribution of ethical conduct tells us little (as the use and misuse of 
horror stories starkly demonstrates) about the dominant value system that informs everyday 
conduct.”). Lawyers may also act in a variety of other ways that may be considered unethical or 
otherwise inappropriate. For example, they may make decisions that are discriminatory, take 
undue credit for joint work, or treat others with disrespect. 
15. In this Article, we neither take a position on what ethical standards ought to be applied 
to attorneys, nor on how ethical misconduct ought to be sanctioned. Instead, our goal is to 
educate attorneys and legal organizations on how best to fulfill their own ethical goals. Cf. 
Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Research 
Paper No. 13-31, Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2320605 (urging that 
legal ethical rules ought to be made clearer and less discretionary in light of our inability to 
maintain objectivity while maintaining partisan positions). 
16. A.B.A. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP., supra note 6 (surveying lawyer disciplinary agencies 
across the 50 states). In 2010, there were approximately 1.4 million licensed attorneys in the 
U.S., 73,240 complaints against lawyers were investigated, and 5,241 lawyers were charged 
with an ethics violation following a probable cause determination. Id.  
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complaints are both over and under inclusive as a measure of attorneys’ 
ethical misconduct. Some complaints may make allegations that are 
unfounded. Conversely, much misconduct may never be discovered or 
reported. Still, the anecdotes, press reports, and ethical complaints suggest 
that there is reason for  concern. 
Concerns about ethics cut across all sizes and types of practice. While 
lawyers at smaller firms tend to be disciplined by the Bar more often than 
attorneys who practice at larger or more prestigious firms,17 it is by no 
means clear that small firm lawyers are inherently less ethical.18 Indeed, it is 
evident that attorneys at some of the biggest and most respected firms 
sometimes commit serious ethical infractions—lying in affidavits,19 failing 
to produce discovery,20 helping their client’s officers breach their fiduciary 
duties,21 and other ethical improprieties.22 Ethical missteps reach all levels 
of prominence. Indeed, two former U.S. presidents (Richard Nixon and Bill 
Clinton) were disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.23 
Ethical problems afflict criminal attorneys as well as those handling civil 
cases. Prosecutors have been found to have committed ethical violations 
such as concealing exculpatory evidence, knowingly presenting false 
testimony, misleading witnesses, or continuing to prosecute criminals after 
                                                                                                                            
17. Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 309, 312 (2004). 
18. See Brown & Wolf, supra note 14, at 260 (noting that the “higher claim rate [against 
solo and small firm practitioners] appears to stem . . . from challenges that are specific to small 
scale practice: a client base composed primarily of individuals rather than institutions, lower 
average hourly billing rates, and a high volume of clients to balance lower rates.”); Levin, supra 
note 17, at 387 (noting that many solo and small firm lawyers are “overwhelmed by their 
financial circumstances or caseloads”). It may also be true that the Bar comes down harder on 
attorneys at smaller or solo firms. Levin, supra note 17, at 314 (“It may be easier for under-
financed discipline systems to successfully prosecute cases against solo or small firm 
practitioners—who have fewer resources to defend against these complaints.”). 
19. REGAN, supra note 13, at 1, 3 (describing John Gellene from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley 
& McCloy). 
20. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05CV1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *16 
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (involving attorneys from Heller Ehrman LLP); Kiechel, supra note 10 
(describing lawyers at Donovan Leisure who hid documents).  
21. Final Report of Neal Batson, supra note 9, at 6–13; see also Robert W. Gordon, A New 
Role for Lawyers? The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2003) 
(observing that Enron lawyers from Vinson & Elkins facilitated flawed transactions). 
22. See Symposium, In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler: A 
Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyers’ Ethics, and the Rule of Law, 66 S. CALIF. L. 
REV. 977, 979–84 (1993) (detailing the chronology of events leading to the Kaye, Scholer 
scandal). See generally Ed Hendricks & Mary Berkheiser, Where Were the Lawyers?, 18 LITIG. 
30, 30 (1992); William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and 
the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 243 (1998).  
23. In re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Neal v. Clinton, No. CIV 2000-
5677, 2001 WL 34355768 (Ark. Cir. Jan. 19, 2001) (five-year suspension). 
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DNA testing seems to show they are not guilty.24 Similarly, criminal 
defense attorneys, whether in public defenders’ or private offices, have been 
found to have failed to exercise adequate diligence in representing their 
clients.25 
Some have suggested that lawyers behave badly because they are 
inherently “bad”26 or “stupid,”27 because they are susceptible to undue 
pressure from their clients,28 because they are under-regulated,29 or even 
because they are over-regulated.30 Surely some attorneys do deliberately 
engage in conduct that they know to be wrong in order to benefit 
themselves or their client. However, psychological research suggests a more 
complex story: that those who commit ethical infractions are not necessarily 
“bad apples,” but are human beings. Many ethical lapses result from a 
combination of situational pressures and all too human modes of thinking.31 
                                                                                                                            
24. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, The Use of Ethical and Unconstitutional 
Practices and Policies by Prosecutors’ Offices, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (2012). 
25. Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for 
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 344 (noting that “public 
defenders, contract lawyers, or appointed counsel—fail to properly investigate in a substantial 
number of cases”). 
26. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 992 
(1997) (observing that a “bad” man, who “cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed 
and practised [sic] by his neighbors,” nonetheless has an incentive to obey the law in order to 
avoid fines and stay out of jail). 
27. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary 
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 711 (1998) (noting that lawyers often characterize 
ethics violations as “isolated examples of lawyers being ‘stupid,’ that is, failing to take adequate 
account of the downside risks to themselves and to their clients of rule violations”). 
28. Levin, supra note 17, at 337 (discussing the ethical challenge of dealing with “a client 
who wished to engage in some form of fraud”). 
29. Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 
693, 750 (2006) (advocating better use of “rulemaking to restrain the current professional 
default principle of zealous advocacy”). 
30. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical 
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 885–86 (1996) (arguing that typical statutory 
prohibitions are likely to stifle “sentimental responsiveness, a key feature of good ethical 
deliberation,” by encouraging lawyers to take a technocratic approach rather than to engage a 
more virtuous approach); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: 
Saltwater for Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311, 311 (1987) (arguing that “increasing ethical 
regulation may magnify troublesome problems of role morality and even impede lawyers’ moral 
development”); see also Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the 
Law of Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 
EMORY L.J. 1255, 1282–83 (1999) (critiquing reliance on ethical rules on grounds that they 
inevitably leave too much room for discretion and discourage lawyers from thoroughly 
considering how to behave when rules do not apply). 
31. See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer, Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded 
Rationality, 2 TOPICS COGNITIVE SCI. 528, 540 (2010) (raising the concept of “ecological 
morality, that is, that moral behavior results from an interaction between mind and 
  
 
 
 
1112 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
The psychology we present here helps explain how ethical lapses can 
occur more easily and less intentionally than we might imagine, providing 
substantial insight into why attorneys sometimes behave unethically, why 
attorneys may have difficulty curbing or reporting the unethical conduct of 
their clients or fellow attorneys, and why it is often difficult for attorneys to 
learn from their own ethical missteps and the missteps of others. It also 
helps us see how, even as we make what could be considered to be 
unethical decisions, we may still believe we are ethical actors. At the same 
time, the psychological research also provides insight into why attorneys are 
often able to resist substantial pressure to act unethically—pressure that 
comes from clients, adversaries, superiors, and their own self-interest.32 
While we are not the first to apply certain social science insights to the 
ethical behavior of attorneys in particular settings or situations,33 this Article 
                                                                                                                            
environment”); Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bad Barrels: Meta-
Analytic Evidence About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1, 1 
(2010) (finding that characteristics of the individual, the ethical issue, and the environment work 
together to influence ethical decision making and behavior); Benoît Monin & Alexander H. 
Jordan, The Dynamic Moral Self: A Social Psychological Perspective, in PERSONALITY, 
IDENTITY, AND CHARACTER: EXPLORATIONS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 341 (Darcia Narvaez & 
Daniel K. Lapsley eds., 2009). See generally BUSINESS ETHICS: SHAPING AN EMERGING FIELD 
(David De Cremer & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 2011); Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets 
Behavioral Law and Economics, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 
(Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., forthcoming); Max H. Bazerman & Francesca Gino, 
Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85 (2012); Michael Bommer et al., A Behavioral Model of Ethical and 
Unethical Decision Making, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS 265 (1987); Celia Moore et al., Why Employees 
Do Bad Things: Moral Disengagement and Unethical Organizational Behavior, 65 PERSONNEL 
PSYCHOL. 1 (2012) (developing a measure of an individual’s propensity to morally disengage); 
Linda Klebe Trevino, Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-Situation 
Interactionist Model, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 601 (1986).  
32. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 17, at 337 (describing how attorneys report resisting 
pressures to act unethically). 
33. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons 
of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006) (prosecutors); Burke, supra note 12 
(prosecutors); Eldred, supra note 25 (criminal defense lawyers); Kath Hall & Vivien Holmes, 
The Power of Rationalisation to Influence Lawyers’ Decisions to Act Unethically, 11 LEGAL 
ETHICS 137 (2009) (in-house counsel); Kim, supra note 9 (in-house counsel); Kimberly 
Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631 
(2005) (attorneys in large firms); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A 
Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 
(1993) (corporate counsel); Levin, supra note 17 (small and solo law firm practitioners); 
Gregory S. McNeal, Organizational Culture, Professional Ethics and Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 125 (2009) (military attorneys); Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a 
Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors that Contribute to 
Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
773 (1998) (large firm litigators); Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate 
Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451 (2007); Cassandra Burke 
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is the first to provide a comprehensive survey of the implications of 
psychology for legal ethics. In addition, we provide detailed suggestions 
about how individuals, attorneys, and legal organizations can improve 
attorneys’ ethics across practice areas and settings. 
In Part I of the Article we examine the ethical blind spots, slippery 
slopes, and “ethical fading” that may lead good people to behave badly. 
These insights may offer some comfort—suggesting that there are not as 
many inherently bad people (or lawyers) in the world as we might have 
believed. But this psychologically rich understanding also raises concerns, 
because it implies that all of us are in danger of behaving unethically should 
the right (or wrong) circumstances present themselves. 
The nature of legal practice means that lawyers face a set of particularly 
difficult challenges. Part II explains that complex and ambiguous ethical 
rules and standards, agency relationships, the ethos of the adversarial 
system, the pressures of modern legal practice, positions or feelings of 
relative status or power, and cues or pressure from others are all 
characteristics of the practice of law that attorneys need to pay attention to 
if they want to avoid crossing ethical lines.34 
In Part III, we examine why it is difficult to recognize and learn from 
ethical lapses. Unfortunately, the same kinds of psychological phenomena 
that can make it hard for lawyers to notice and avoid ethical issues in the 
first instance also make it difficult for them to identify and learn from 
ethical mistakes. 
Finally, in Part IV, we draw on the psychological research to make some 
suggestions for how individual attorneys and legal employers can enhance 
their ethics.35 While in the end, we do not pretend to offer complete 
                                                                                                                            
Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and 
Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389 (2009) (government lawyers); see also 
Lawrence J. Fox, I’m Just an Associate . . . At a New York Firm, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 
939–53 (2000) (recounting fictional story of an associate who is instructed by a senior partner to 
engage in unethical behavior). 
34. We also recognize that many ethical improprieties within the profession are related to 
drug or alcohol issues or mental health problems. While these issues are important, and may 
relate in part to the stresses we identify, they are not our focus. See, e.g., Sheila Blackford, 
Dealing with Impaired Attorneys, LAW PRAC. TODAY (June 2009), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/pma06091.shtml (noting that impaired lawyers “are 
frequently the subject of ethics complaints for not communicating with clients and neglecting 
legal matters”); MICHAEL A. BEDKE & JOHN W. KEEGAN, A.B.A. YOUNG LAW. DIV., COMM’N 
ON IMPAIRED ATTORNEYS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ¶ I (1995) (reporting estimates 
that a substantial proportion of lawyer discipline cases are related to impairment). 
35. While the psychology we review here surely has implications for the content of the 
rules of professional conduct as well, we do not address those implications here. Instead, we 
take as a given the legal and regulatory structure governing professional conduct and explore 
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solutions that will ensure attorneys’ ethical behavior, we do hope that our 
psychological lens will help equip lawyers to better resist the temptations of 
unethical conduct. 
I. BOUNDED ETHICALITY 
Ethical lapses occur more easily and less intentionally than we might 
imagine. While most of us desire to act ethically,36 “psychological processes 
. . . [can] lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are 
inconsistent with their own preferred ethics.”37 
As an initial example, consider the downfall of prominent bankruptcy 
attorney John Gellene, as described by Milton Regan in the book Eat What 
You Kill.38 Gellene, a “bankruptcy partner at the prestigious Wall Street law 
firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. . . . was regarded as one of the 
best bankruptcy lawyers in the country, and had worked on some of the 
largest corporate reorganizations in the world.”39 In the mid-1990s, Gellene 
and Milbank represented Bucyrus-Erie, a manufacturer of mining tools, as it 
reorganized in bankruptcy. Following the bankruptcy proceedings, Bucyrus-
Erie was healthy enough to be purchased by “a large private investment 
partnership.”40 But the Bucyrus-Erie bankruptcy would not turn out so 
successfully for Gellene, who ended up in jail.41 
[Gellene had originally] been asked by powerful Milbank partner 
Larry Lederman to provide his services to Bucyrus because of 
Gellene’s experience in bankruptcy and financial restructuring. 
Lederman had advised Bucyrus off and on for five years. He also 
had provided legal guidance for several years to investment banker 
Mikael Salovaara. Salovaara had furnished financial advice to 
Bucyrus over the same five-year period. He was a former 
Goldman Sachs partner who had recently left the firm with a 
colleague to establish an investment fund known as South Street. 
                                                                                                                            
the implications of behavioral ethics for individual attorneys and their employers within the 
existing regulatory context. 
36. See Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept 
Maintenance, 45 J. MKTG. RES. 633, 634 (2008) (arguing that people strive to maintain a self-
concept that includes honesty). 
37. MAX H. BAZERMAN & DON A. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 
123 (7th ed. 2008); see also C. Daniel Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy: Appearing Moral to 
Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 525 (1999) (“Moral 
people often fail to act morally.”). 
38. See REGAN, supra note 13, at 1. 
39. Id.  
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 287. 
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In 1992, South Street had advanced $35 million to Bucyrus in 
return for a lien on all the company’s manufacturing equipment. 
As the company’s major secured creditor, South Street would be 
first in line to be paid if Bucyrus filed for bankruptcy. . . . 
[In applying to be appointed as Bucyrus-Erie’s counsel,] Gellene 
was required under Bankruptcy Rule 2014 to list his and 
Milbank’s connections with any party in interest in the 
bankruptcy. At the time, Milbank also was representing Mikael 
Salovaara on one matter and South Street on another. Gellene 
himself was the lead counsel in the South Street matter, although 
he had done very little work on the case. The work for Salovaara 
and South Street created a potential conflict of interest for the law 
firm. As counsel for Bucyrus in its bankruptcy, Milbank would 
represent a debtor that had a duty to treat fairly all parties with a 
claim on its assets. As counsel for Salovaara and South Street, 
Milbank might have an incentive to provide advice to Bucyrus that 
favored South Street over other creditors. 
[But] Gellene didn’t disclose these Milbank ties to Salovaara when 
he submitted the affidavits that accompanied his application.
42
 
When Milbank’s ties to Salovaara and South Street were eventually 
uncovered, the firm was required to return the $1.86 million in fees that it 
had earned in the bankruptcy case and settled a professional malpractice suit 
for between $27 and $50 million.43 For his part, Gellene was charged with 
and convicted of violating Bankruptcy Rule 2014 for “making false 
declarations in the affidavits he had submitted to [the judge and] . . . for 
using a false affidavit under oath to claim that Milbank was eligible to 
receive payment for its work on the bankruptcy.”44 He was sentenced to 15 
months in prison and a $15,000 fine.45 How did John Gellene fall so far and 
so hard? 
It is wishful thinking to assume that only “bad apples”—people who 
differ from us in important ways—will make unethical decisions: 
In our conventional way of thinking about ourselves, we 
are confident that we would know in advance that to do some set 
of actions would be morally wrong, and that this realization, 
                                                                                                                            
42. Id. at 2–3. 
43. Id. at 3. 
44. Id.  
45. Id. at 1–3, 287; see also Nancy B. Rapoport, The Curious Incident of the Law Firm 
That Did Nothing in the Night-Time, 10 LEGAL ETHICS 98, 98–114 (2007) (reviewing REGAN, 
supra note 13). 
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occurring prior to the actions, would prevent us from taking them. 
These comforting thoughts turn out to be not true.
46
 
Instead, we will see that many psychological phenomena contribute to 
decisions to act unethically and make it challenging to identify and 
appropriately respond to the ethical lapses of others—including colleagues 
and clients. 
A. Ethical Blindspots 
Unethical decisions are more likely when the decision maker does not 
see the decision at hand as involving ethical issues or when she believes that 
any potential ethical challenges can easily be overcome. Each of us tends to 
believe that we see the world objectively;47 to see ourselves as more fair, 
unbiased, competent, and deserving than average;48 and to be overconfident 
about our abilities and prospects.49 This tendency to view the self in positive 
terms is heightened when the characteristic at issue is socially desirable—as 
is the case with ethical behavior. Indeed, attorneys tend to believe that their 
own ethics and their firm’s ethical standards are more stringent than those 
of other attorneys and other firms.50 
                                                                                                                            
46. John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational 
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2005). 
47. Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of 
Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 793 (2004); Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, 
Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in 
VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 110–11 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996). 
48. See, e.g., David Alain Armor, The Illusion of Objectivity: A Bias in the Perception of 
Freedom from Bias (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Los 
Angeles); Scott T. Allison et al., On Being Better but not Smarter Than Others: The Muhammad 
Ali Effect, 7 SOC. COGNITION 275, 291 (1989); Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling 
“Holier Than Thou”: Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social 
Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 861, 861 (2000); Roderick M. Kramer et al., 
Self-Enhancement Biases and Negotiator Judgment: Effects of Self-Esteem and Mood, 56 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 110, 124 (1993); Wim B.G. Liebrand 
et al., Why We Are Fairer Than Others: A Cross-Cultural Replication and Extension, 22 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 590 (1986); David M. Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than 
Others, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 480 (1985). 
49. See, e.g., Roger Buehler et al., The Planning Fallacy: Cognitive, Motivational, and 
Social Origins, 43 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 8 (2010); Jane Goodman-
Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 133, 144–45 (2010); Don A. Moore & Paul J. Healy, The Trouble 
With Overconfidence, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 502, 502 (2008). 
50. Jonathan R.B. Halbesleben et al., The Role of Pluralistic Ignorance in Perceptions of 
Unethical Behavior: An Investigation of Attorneys’ and Students’ Perceptions of Ethical 
Behavior, 14 ETHICS & BEHAV. 17, 18 (2004). With regard to attorneys’ views of their firms, 
see Gordon, supra note 27; Messikomer, supra note 14; Nelson, supra note 33. 
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These views of the self can lead to an ethical blind spot that impedes our 
ability to perceive and thoughtfully consider the ethical tensions we 
inevitably face.51 If we are objective, fair, and unbiased, then we need not be 
concerned that we might take unfair advantage of another or unfairly 
privilege one person or position over another. If we are competent, then we 
need not question our ability to act or decide appropriately. If we are 
deserving, then any benefits we receive must be warranted. If we do not 
realize that our judgments of fairness are influenced by our own interests, 
then we do not need to be on guard against such conflicts.52 And if we are 
overconfident—in our own ethical judgment, or in our ability to fix or 
otherwise manage ethical problems—then we are unlikely to stop and think 
carefully about a decision or to revisit that decision later. 
In addition, people commonly make inaccurate forecasts of their own 
future emotions and behavior—and, thus, may predict that they will act 
ethically when this is not necessarily so.53 It is clear that in the heat of the 
moment, we respond to a variety of incentives and practical forces.54 We 
want to impress (or at least not disappoint) the client by reaching the 
settlement, getting the contract signed, or winning the case. We want to be 
                                                                                                                            
51. Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing 
Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, 
LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 80 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005). See generally 
Pronin et al., supra note 47; Richard F. West et al., Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate 
the Bias Blind Spot, 103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 506 (2012). 
52. Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 171, 181–
82 (2004). 
53. See, e.g., Kristina A. Diekmann et al., From Self-Prediction to Self-Defeat: Behavioral 
Forecasting, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, and the Effect of Competitive Expectations, 85 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 672, 674 (2003) (finding that people mis-predict their behavior 
in negotiation); Oriel Feldman Hall et al., What We Say and What We Do: The Relationship 
Between Real and Hypothetical Moral Choices, 123 COGNITION 434, 438 (2012); Janet K. 
Swim & Lauri L. Hyers, Excuse Me—What Did You Just Say?! Women’s Public and Private 
Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 83 (1999); Julie A. 
Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined Gender Harassment, 57 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 15, 24 (2001) (finding that people mispredict their response to inappropriate interview 
questions). See generally Emily Balcetis & David A. Dunning, A Mile in Moccasins: How 
Situational Experience Diminishes Dispositionism in Social Inference, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 102 (2008); Buehler et al., supra note 49 (finding that people predict they will 
get projects done more quickly than they do). 
54. Karl Aquino et al., Testing a Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behavior: The 
Interactive Influence of Situations and Moral Identity Centrality, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 123, 131 (2009); Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Misrepresentation and Expectations of 
Misrepresentation in an Ethical Dilemma: The Role of Incentives and Temptation, 41 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 330, 334–35 (1998) (finding that incentives increase temptation and also the 
likelihood of acting on temptation); see also Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences, 
95 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 391 (2005). 
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seen (and to see ourselves) as competent.55 Members of a firm don’t want to 
act against the culture of the firm,56 or put their promotion or job at risk.57 
Decision makers feel pressure to make decisions quickly and efficiently. 
But when we are predicting our future behavior, we focus on our idealistic 
self—the self that “places principles and values above practical 
considerations and seeks to express the person’s sense of true self.”58 With 
this ideal self in mind, abstract ethical considerations, rather than situational 
pressures, tend to be our focus and we anticipate that we will act ethically. 
When the time horizon shortens and we are in the moment, our attention 
shifts to our pragmatic self—the self that is “primarily guided by practical 
concerns” and is likely to seize opportunity, act impulsively, and focus on 
the pragmatics of the situation.59 
B. Slippery Slopes and Boiling Frogs 
Another factor that can contribute to our bounded ethics is that the path 
to unethical conduct often runs along a slippery slope. Just as it is 
frequently extremely difficult for people to visually detect changes in their 
environment,60 so can it be quite difficult to notice when conduct degrades 
gradually. Psychologist Stanley Milgram famously found that people would 
follow the instructions of an experimenter to administer slightly 
                                                                                                                            
55. Dennis J. Moberg, Ethics Blind Spots in Organizations: How Systematic Errors in 
Person Perception Undermine Moral Agency, 27 ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 413, 417 (2006). 
56. See, e.g., Kirkland, supra note 33, at 705 (noting that lawyers are affected by the 
“logic of their firms”). 
57. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (refusing to grant First 
Amendment protection to deputy district attorney who alleged he was denied a promotion after 
criticizing the legitimacy of a warrant); see also Fox, supra note 33, at 949 (discussing fears of 
junior associate who knew he ought to report partner’s unethical conduct). 
58. Yifat Kivetz & Tom R. Tyler, Tomorrow I’ll Be Me: The Effect of Time Perspective on 
the Activation of Idealistic Versus Pragmatic Selves, 102 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 193, 193 (2007). 
59. Id.; see also Hal E. Hershfield et al., Short Horizons and Tempting Situations: Lack of 
Continuity to Our Future Selves Leads to Unethical Decision Making and Behavior, 117 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 298, 303 (2012) (finding that feeling 
continuous with and able to imagine one’s future self makes future consequences more 
prominent and decreases unethical behavior); Daniel Read et al., Mixing Virtue and Vice: 
Combining the Immediacy Effect and the Diversification Heuristic, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 257, 258 (1999); Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 403, 403 (2003). More generally, taking a broad perspective is less likely to result in 
unethical behavior than is a narrow perspective that focuses on individual decisions in isolation. 
Amos Schurr et al., Is That the Answer You Had In Mind? The Effect of Perspective on 
Unethical Behavior, 7 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 679, 679 (2012). 
60. See, e.g., Daniel J. Simons et al., Change Blindness in the Absence of a Visual 
Disruption, 29 PERCEPTION 1143, 1143 (2000). 
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increasingly severe shocks to another person, ostensibly as part of an 
experiment on punishment and learning.61 The step-by-step nature of the 
shift may be one reason why so many people (63% of participants) ended 
up being willing to administer shocks that elicited increasingly “desperate” 
cries of pain to the point that the other person became seemingly non-
responsive.62 It seems that the gradual intensification of the shock made it 
difficult for participants to determine precisely when they were being asked 
to cross the line. This ride down the slippery ethics slope turns out to be a 
bit like the apocryphal story about how to boil frogs: “Folk wisdom says 
that if you throw a frog in boiling water, it will jump out. But if you put a 
frog in nice warm water and slowly raise the temperature, by the time the 
frog realizes the water has become too hot, it will already be cooked.”63 
Early decisions may be made in circumstances in which the ethical 
course of action is not clear. Wanting to believe that the small steps we have 
already taken have been good ones and preferring to act in ways that are 
consistent with our previous behavior,64 we find it difficult to shift course. 
Eventually, as a practice becomes routine, the points at which deliberation 
might have occurred disappear, as do the decision’s ethical contours.65 
“Over time, people become more comfortable pushing the boundaries of 
professional propriety, and they also find themselves having to continue 
previous courses of action in order to avoid admitting that their earlier 
actions were improper.”66 
                                                                                                                            
61. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 123 (1974); see also Jerry M. Burger, 
Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 1, 8 (2009) 
(attempting to partially replicate Milgram’s study and obtaining similar results). 
62. Burger, supra note 61, at 8. 
63. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 37, at 48; see also Francesca Gino & Max H. 
Bazerman, When Misconduct Goes Unnoticed: The Acceptability of Gradual Erosion in Others’ 
Unethical Behavior, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 708, 717 (2009). 
64. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 52 (5th ed. 2009). 
65. See Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in 
Organizations, 25 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 3 (2003); Linda K. Treviño et al., 
Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. MGMT. 951, 970 (2006). See generally 
HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE 18 (1989). 
66. Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology 
of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 196 (2004); see also Michael Guttentag, 
Stumbling into Crime: Stochastic Process Models of Accounting Fraud, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 204 (Alon Harel & Keith Hylton eds., 2011); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the 
Financial Crisis (Georgetown Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper, No. 11-135, 2011), 
available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1156&context=fwps_papers 
(noting that “by the time reality starts to set in, our complicity is set as well”). 
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C. Ethical Fading 
Ethical blindspots and the contours of the slippery slope contribute to a 
process of ethical fading or moral disengagement in which decision makers 
“do not ‘see’ the moral components of an ethical decision, not so much 
because they are morally uneducated, but because psychological processes 
fade the ‘ethics’ from an ethical dilemma.”67 A variety of additional 
psychological processes also play a role in fading ethical considerations 
from view, making unethical decisions more likely. 
For example, the scripts—knowledge structures that guide our 
understanding of how events typically unfold—that govern a particular 
situation may determine whether or not ethical considerations are taken into 
account.68 One “may approach a particular [decision] with a script that has 
moral content, triggering moral judgment processes, or with one that is 
devoid of moral content, triggering non-moral judgment processes.”69 The 
relevant script may characterize a particular decision—such as whether a 
conflict is an obstacle to taking on representation of a new client—as a 
business decision as opposed to an ethical decision, fading the ethical 
implications from view.70 Consider the Ford Pinto. The Pinto’s gas tank was 
                                                                                                                            
67. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception 
in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 224 (2004); see also Albert Bandura, Moral 
Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities, 3 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 
193, 193 (1999); James R. Detert et al., Moral Disengagement in Ethical Decision Making: A 
Study of Antecedents and Outcomes, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 374, 374 (2008); Moore et al., 
supra note 31, at 2. 
68. See Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the Script Concept, 36 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 715, 715 (1981). 
69. Kenneth D. Butterfield et al., Moral Awareness in Business Organizations: Influences 
of Issue-Related and Social Context Factors, 53 HUM. REL. 981, 989 (2000). 
70. See id.; Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67. Aspects of a situation can evoke 
business or competitive norms. See, e.g., Aaron C. Kay et al., Material Priming: The Influence 
of Mundane Physical Objects on Situational Construal and Competitive Behavioral Choice, 95 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 83 (2004) (finding that those primed 
with things associated with business tend to act less cooperatively); Maryam Kouchaki et al., 
Seeing Green: Mere Exposure to Money Triggers a Business Decision Frame and Unethical 
Outcomes, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 53 (2013); Kathleen D. 
Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCI. 1154, 1154 (2006) (finding 
that when reminded of money, people tend to behave more selfishly); Francesca Gino & Lamar 
Pierce, The Abundance Effect: Unethical Behavior in the Presence of Wealth, 109 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 142, 142 (2009); see also Qing Yang 
et al., Diverging Effects of Clean Versus Dirty Money on Attitudes, Values, and Interpersonal 
Behavior, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 473, 473 (2013). For evidence that clearing 
conflicts is often thought of as a business, rather than an ethical, decision, see Kimberly 
Kirkland, Ethical Infrastructures and De Facto Ethical Norms at Work in Large US Law Firms: 
The Role of Ethics Counsel, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 181, 181 (2008). More generally, legal rules or 
practices may cue moral intuitions in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter & Stephan W. 
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susceptible to rupture and burst into flames in slow-speed crashes. Observe 
how Ford’s Field Recall Coordinator describes his reaction to early reports 
of fires involving the Pinto: 
My cue for labeling a case as a problem either required 
high frequencies of occurrence or directly-traceable causes. I had 
little time for speculative contemplation on potential problems that 
did not fit a pattern that suggested known courses of action leading 
to possible recall. . . . I remember no strong ethical overtones to 
the case whatsoever. It was a very straightforward decision, driven 
by dominant scripts for the time, place, and context.
71
 
The early reports of Pintos “lighting up” did not fit the Coordinator’s 
schema for what a problem would look like—these reports “trickle[d] in” 
and “did not fit the pattern of recallable standards; the evidence was not 
overwhelming that the car was defective in some way.” Accordingly, the 
ethical dimensions of the decision about whether to recall were not focal in 
his mind.72 
This account is consistent with lawyers’ frequent reactions to discussions 
of ethics. In interviews, lawyers’ responses 
suggest[] that they simply did not think very much about legal 
ethics or that they did not consider the issues they confronted in 
moral or ethical terms. One lawyer explained that he did not 
confront ethical issues because “when you’re dealing with big 
companies, it doesn’t seem to come up.” . . . In some cases 
lawyers appeared to be so acculturated to certain practices they did 
not consider the ethical issues implicated by those practices.
73
 
Certain routine decisions or practices—providing competent services, 
maintaining sufficient support staff, or communicating with clients—may 
not be thought of as raising ethical issues in the same ways as more 
egregious behaviors, such as fraudulent misrepresentation or sleeping with a 
client.74 But, these practices are covered by the formal rules of ethics75 and 
                                                                                                                            
Tontrup, How Law Frames Moral Intuitions: The Expressive Effect of Specific Performance, 54 
ARIZ. L. REV. 673, 673 (2012); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 1 (2000); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral 
Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 405, 405 (2009). 
71. Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed 
Opportunities, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 381–82, 388 (1992).  
72. Id. at 380; see also Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 1977, 
available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness. 
73. Levin, supra note 17, at 336 (citation omitted). 
74. See, e.g., id. at 336 (finding that attorneys were unlikely to raise such routine issues in 
discussions of ethics). 
75. See infra note 91. 
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tend to comprise a significant proportion of the complaints made to bar 
disciplinary authorities.76 
Along these same lines, the language that we use to describe a particular 
act or decision can mask its ethical contours. Euphemisms—such as friendly 
fire, collateral damage, downsizing, strategic misrepresentation, creative 
time-keeping, bluffing, decedent, a case with bad facts, or Ford Pintos 
lighting up—can strip the decision of much of its ethical content.77 These 
effects of language can even be seen in the ways that lawyers prefer to talk 
about ethical issues. Lawyers tend to shy away from labeling behavior as 
“misconduct,” and are seemingly more comfortable discussing issues 
involving “gray areas” or “incivility.”78 
This minimizing of the ethical implications of an act is also seen in the 
ways that we compare the act to other real or hypothetical acts. One might 
be able to construct a tenuous justification for the unethical act.79 And, it is 
usually possible to imagine instances of behavior that are worse than the act 
at issue and such advantageous comparisons can be used to cast a particular 
decision in a more positive light.80 Indeed, this sort of comparison is 
common among lawyers who have been disciplined for ethical breaches, 
with lawyers pointing to more egregious breaches than those with which 
they are charged.81 
The perceived moral intensity of a decision can also be influenced by the 
ease with which the nature, magnitude, probability, and timing of any 
potential consequences can be drawn to mind.82 For example, decisions are 
seen as more unethical when they result in observable harm (the outcome 
                                                                                                                            
76. See supra note 14. 
77. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67, at 226; see also Bandura, supra note 67, at 195; 
William Safire, The Fine Art of Euphemism, S.F. SUN. EXAMINER & CHRON., May 13, 1979, at 
34. 
78. Messikomer, supra note 14, at 742; see also RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE 
DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 101 (2008) (noting disciplined 
lawyer’s argument that he “was guilty of ‘mistakes,’ not ‘professional misconduct.’”). 
79. See Shaul Shalvi et al., Justified Ethicality: Observing Desired Counterfactuals 
Modifies Ethical Perceptions and Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 181, 181 (2011); see also Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, The Dark Side of 
Creativity: Original Thinkers Can Be More Dishonest, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
445, 446 (2012); Shaul Shalvi et al., Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of Justifications), 23 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1264, 1264 (2012). 
80. See Bandura, supra note 67, at 196. 
81. ABEL, supra note 78, at 32, 200. 
82. This is an instance of the availability heuristic. When particular information is 
available or accessible in memory, it has a greater influence on judgments and decisions. See, 
e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). 
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bias)83 and when they harm identifiable victims.84 In contrast, when harm is 
perceived as less likely to occur or more removed in time, the decision will 
feel less ethically fraught.85  
Decision makers are also more likely to engage in a range of unethical 
behaviors when facing a decision that is framed as a loss than when the 
same decision is framed as a gain.86 For instance, professional tax preparers 
have been found to be more likely to approve returns containing large 
deductions associated with ambiguous tax rules when they are faced with 
the possibility of losing an existing client as compared to when they are in 
the position of trying to develop new clients.87 In addition, decision makers 
who are falling just short of reaching their goals are more likely to act 
unethically (for example, to misrepresent their performance).88 
Consider how this might apply to a young associate trying to meet the 
firm’s billable hour requirement. Taking the billable hour requirement as 
                                                                                                                            
83. The outcome bias occurs when people judge the quality of a decision based on its 
outcome—for example, decisions resulting in negative consequences are judged to have been 
bad decisions. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 
54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 569 (1988); Francesca Gino et al., No Harm, No 
Foul: The Outcome Bias in Ethical Judgments (Harv. Bus. School, Working Paper No. 08-080, 
2008). 
84. Francesca Gino et al., Nameless + Harmless = Blameless: When Seemingly Irrelevant 
Factors Influence Judgment of (Un)ethical Behavior, 111 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 93, 94 (2010); see also Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining 
the “Identifiable Victim Effect,” 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 236 (1997). 
85. Sefa Hayibor & David M Wasieleski, Effects of the Use of the Availability Heuristic 
on Ethical Decision-Making in Organizations, 84 J. BUS. ETHICS 151, 153 (2009); see also 
Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 5. 
86. Jessica S. Cameron & Dale T. Miller, Ethical Standards in Gain Versus Loss Frames, 
in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR AND DECISION MAKING 91 (David De 
Cremer ed., 2009); Mary C. Kern & Dolly Chugh, Bounded Ethicality: The Perils of Loss 
Framing, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 378, 378 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the 
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 119 (1996) (Study 2); Christopher P. Reinders 
Folmer & David De Cremer, Bad for Me or Bad for Us? Interpersonal Orientations and the 
Impact of Losses on Unethical Behavior, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 760, 766–77 
(2012) (exploring moderators of the effect of loss frame on ethics); see also Francesca Gino & 
Joshua D. Margolis, Bringing Ethics Into Focus: How Regulatory Focus and Risk Preferences 
Influence (Un)Ethical Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
145, 147 (2011); see generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, & 
Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343–44 (1984).  
87. Kaye J. Newberry et al., An Examination of Tax Practitioner Decisions: The Role of 
Preparer Sanctions and Framing Effects Associated with Client Condition, 14 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 439, 441 (1993); see also Henry S. J. Robben et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity 
as Determinants of Tax Cheating: An International Experimental Study, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 
341, 344–45 (1990); Elizabeth F. Loftus, To File, Perchance to Cheat, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 
1985, at 35, 37–38.  
88. Maurice E. Schweitzer et al., Goal Setting as a Motivator of Unethical Behavior, 47 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 422, 422 (2004). 
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the relevant reference point, the associate may fall just short and may 
perceive this failure as a loss.89 Both of these features of the situation tend 
to increase the likelihood of unethical behavior. Similarly, a client and 
lawyer who are engaged in selling an unsuccessful business90 are likely to 
find themselves in a loss frame and at greater risk of unethical behavior. By 
the same token, once one has stumbled into an unethical decision, 
considerations about what to do next are likely to be made in a loss frame. 
One can own up to one’s unethical decision and face the negative 
consequences now, or keep quiet and face a possible and uncertain loss 
sometime in the future. Such a posture can make risk-seeking behavior 
more likely. 
II. ETHICS IN LAW PRACTICE 
The psychological tendencies that may lead people to behave unethically 
can be compounded by particular aspects of legal practice. The rules 
governing professional conduct, the agency relationship between attorney 
and client, the role of advocate, the demands of practice, the status inherent 
in the legal profession, and the social environment of the firm or practice 
area can all influence how lawyers make decisions about issues that 
implicate ethics. While we recognize that other professions face ethical 
challenges as well, we think it is helpful to focus on those aspects of law 
practice that are most likely to influence attorneys. 
A. Ethical Rules and Standards 
The regulation of lawyers’ professional conduct draws on rules and 
norms from a variety of sources. Attorneys are, of course, regulated by the 
rules of professional conduct adopted in their own jurisdiction. These rules 
typically cover, for example, conflicts of interest, veracity, confidentiality, 
advertising, billing, trust funds, and sex with clients.91 Ethical constraints in 
particular contexts are also sometimes set out in statutes or regulations. For 
example, statutory provisions governing wiretapping,92 corporate 
                                                                                                                            
89. Cameron & Miller, supra note 86, at 102–03. 
90. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers’ Rules, Auditors’ Rules and the Psychology of 
Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1417–18 (2000). 
91. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009) (Conflict of Interest: Current 
Clients); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2010) (Candor Toward the Tribunal); CAL. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400 (2012) (Advertising and Solicitation). 
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006). 
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accountability,93 and foreign corruption94 require particular disclosures, 
proscribe certain behavior, or seek to hold lawyers accountable in other 
ways. Court rules regarding evidence, discovery, and other matters provide 
additional regulation.95 
While abundant, the ethical rules governing attorneys leave many gaps, 
and can be ambiguous and even conflicting.96 In addition, many of these 
rules articulate a minimum standard of conduct that must be supplemented 
with guidance from one’s own internal moral code.97 The frequent opacity 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is attributable, at least in part, 
to the potential for intense tension between the duty to diligently represent 
one’s client and duties to opponents, to the public at large, or to the judicial 
system.98 While the Prologue to the Model Rules contemplates that these 
various responsibilities “are usually harmonious,”99 it also recognizes that 
“[v]irtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a 
lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s 
own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory 
living.”100 The Rules endeavor to resolve these conflicts when possible, but 
also provide that often “[s]uch issues must be resolved through the exercise 
                                                                                                                            
93. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
94. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). 
95. Recall that John Gellene, the attorney in our opening example, was tripped up by 
Bankruptcy Rule 2014. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014 (requiring “a verified statement of the 
person to be employed setting forth the person’s connections with the debtor, creditors, any 
other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or 
any person employed in the office of the United States trustee”). See generally Fred C. 
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 
(2009) (discussing different forms of lawyer regulation). 
96. See Wendel, supra note 9, at 1168 (arguing that the rules can never be completely 
clear).  
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE AND SCOPE (2010) (noting the 
importance of a lawyer’s “personal conscience” as a guide to professional responsibility and 
observing that the “Rules do not . . . exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should 
inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules”); 
see also Suchman, infra note 101, at 837 (“[A]n ethical profession requires more than just 
professional ethics. It requires a sense of right and wrong . . . that rises above the letter of the 
rules . . .  [and] a set of social structures for creating, preserving, and transmitting this 
understanding in the face of real-world challenges.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 541 (2009) (arguing that “the very structure of the codes is to 
provide a framework under which lawyers can and will act as ordinary moral individuals”). 
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PROLOGUE (2010) (“A lawyer, as a member of the 
legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen 
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”). 
99. Id. 
100. Id.; see also Keith Leavitt et al., Different Hats, Different Obligations: Plural 
Occupational Identities and Situated Moral Judgments, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1316 (2012) 
(exploring the effects on moral judgment of different occupational identities and roles). 
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of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles 
underlying the Rules.”101 
Resolving such ambiguities is particularly challenging because while 
laudable values can underlie good behavior, they can also motivate 
unethical behavior.102 And, lawyers’ expertise at parsing rules, paying 
attention to exceptions and loopholes, interpreting text, and making 
arguments on both sides of an issue, while commendable in many ways, can 
also be problematic in this context.103 Indeed, psychologists have compared 
the process of post-hoc moral reasoning to that of lawyering: “moral 
reasoning is not left free to search for truth but is likely to be hired out like a 
lawyer by various motives, employed only to seek confirmation of 
preordained conclusions.”104 This lawyerly approach can contribute to 
unethical conduct when it comes to ethical rules that specify only minimum 
standards, that raise conflicting standards and gray areas, that involve 
discretionary application of underlying moral principles, and that may be 
supplemented by additional personal morality. 
All of this is enhanced by the fact that lawyers tend to be more 
comfortable talking about “rules” and “norms” and less comfortable talking 
about “morality” or “values.”105 Indeed, law students conclude early on that 
                                                                                                                            
101. Id.; see also Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics 
in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 837 (1998) (“[P]rofessional ethics must 
explicitly incorporate the existence of various competing moral obligations, in a way that purely 
aspirational principles . . . do not.”). Attorneys who work in transnational contexts face even 
greater challenges as they will inevitably encounter conflicting rules and norms across 
jurisdictions. See John Flood, Transnational Lawyering: Clients, Ethics, & Regulation, in 
LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 176, 182 (Leslie C. Levin & 
Lynn Mather eds., 2012). 
102. Jaime D. Crowley & Michael C. Gottlieb, Objects in the Mirror are Closer Than They 
Appear: A Primary Prevention Model for Ethical Decision Making, 43 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & 
PRAC. 65, 68 (2012) (“Sound values can build resiliency, but they can also function as 
vulnerabilities.”); Linda J. Skitka & G. Scott Morgan, The Double Edged Sword of a Moral 
State of Mind, in PERSONALITY, IDENTITY, AND CHARACTER: EXPLORATIONS IN MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 31, at 355; Alan C. Tjeltveit & Michael C. Gottlieb, Avoiding the 
Road to Ethical Disaster: Overcoming Vulnerabilities and Developing Resilience, 47 
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES., PRAC., TRAINING 98, 98 (2010). 
103. While the ethics rules that are applicable to other professionals may share many of the 
features we have described, the particular analytical approach of lawyers may interact with the 
nature of the rules to make these characteristics more problematic. This strikes us as an 
interesting empirical question that would benefit from additional research. 
104. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 822 (2001); see also JONAH LEHRER, 
HOW WE DECIDE 173 (2009) (“When it comes to making ethical decisions, human rationality 
isn’t a scientist, it’s a lawyer. This inner attorney gathers bits of evidence, post hoc 
justifications, and pithy rhetoric in order to make the automatic reaction seem reasonable.”). 
105. Messikomer, supra note 14, at 742; Lynn Mather & Leslie C. Levin, Why Context 
Matters, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 
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what matters is not their opinion about a matter but whether they can 
articulate a credible argument, complicating their inclination to consult their 
own sense of right and wrong.106 One study of lawyers’ ethics found: 
When [attorneys] spoke of “doing the right thing,” they tended to 
define this term as respecting some external source of authority or 
opinion: the civil discovery rules, ethics codes, judges’ orders, 
clients’ orders and preferences. They clearly preferred utilitarian 
(cost-benefit) analysis to normative reasoning, and they exhibited 
a positive allergy to moral language and an inclination to express 
even the norms of basic truth telling and fairness in compliance 
with the standard of some external standard or group.
107
 
This discomfort echoes, and may stem in part from, debates over the role 
that personal morality should (or should not) play in conjunction with the 
lawyer’s professional duties.108 It may also encourage lawyers to take a 
minimalist approach to ethics, substituting rules that may only articulate 
minimum standards for thoughtful reflection on the ethical implications of a 
decision. 
Lawyers may also be affected by the human tendency to be less 
compliant with rules or authorities that they see as illegitimate.109 Lawyers 
in different specialties or communities of practice may encounter different 
norms or find that particular rules fit the contours of that practice area more 
or less well.110 Ethical guidelines that make sense for litigators may not fit 
                                                                                                                            
11; see also Suchman, supra note 101, at 844–45. Business managers, too, resist casting 
decisions in moral terms. See Frederick B. Bird & James A. Waters, The Moral Muteness of 
Managers, 32 CAL. MGMT. REV. 73, 73 (1989); see also Tamar A. Kreps & Benoît Monin, 
“Doing Well By Doing Good”? Ambivalent Moral Framing in Organizations, 31 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 99, 102 (2011). 
106. Our thanks to a law student at the Yale-Quinnipiac Dispute Resolution Workshop for 
putting the problem in these terms. 
107. Gordon, supra note 27, at 732. 
108. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 394 (1988) (describing the 
“standard conception” of the lawyer’s role as “partisanship and nonaccountability”); see 
Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 501 (2011) 
(describing the evolution of this debate); see also Gordon, supra note 21, at 1195 (describing 
conception of the adversary role and offering an alternative role for corporate lawyers). 
109. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 108 (2006); Tom R. Tyler, 
Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 387 
(2006).. 
110. Lynn Mather & Craig McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer Conduct: The 
Challenges of Divorce Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN 
CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 69 (noting that the rules may “ignore the highly variable 
circumstances of legal practice . . . because they must be framed at a level of generality that 
crosses practice areas”). 
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transactional work as well—and vice versa.111 Many solo and small firm 
attorneys see certain rules as calculated to “interfere with [their] business-
getting activities” and, therefore, do not respect them.112 
All of these factors can lead attorneys to adopt a situationist approach to 
ethics. In discussing discovery ethics with attorneys, for example, Robert 
Nelson found that “[t]he answer to almost every question was that it 
‘depends.’ Aggressiveness generally is inappropriate, unless the war was 
initiated by the other side. Hardball usually is inappropriate, unless there is 
a specter of mischievous plaintiffs’ lawyers waiting to use the information 
from discovery for other suits.”113 
In similar ways, ambiguity provides open space for other influences to 
operate as lawyers construct arguments about what is and is not 
appropriate.114 In one study, the lawyers interviewed indicated that they 
“assumed that the ‘real’ meaning of ethical rules was consistent with 
pragmatic concerns, even when the letter of the rules was not.”115 Other 
lawyers talk about the need to “get comfortable” with what a client wants 
them to do—a process by which they convince themselves that a course of 
action is acceptable. This process of getting comfortable is made easier 
when the rules are ambiguous.116 
 
B. The Agency Relationship 
The fact that attorneys are charged with representing clients in agency 
relationships can complicate ethical decision making in several important 
ways. First, although an agent is expected to further the interests of the 
principal, it is clear that attorneys have their own personal interests that may 
or may not be directly compatible with those of their client. In addition, 
clients may be willing to engage in conduct through their attorneys that they 
would not engage in on their own. Similarly, lawyers who might not have 
                                                                                                                            
111. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: 
LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 123, 126 n.14 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 
2000); REGAN, supra note 13, at 328 (describing how conflicts of interest differ in litigation and 
transactional work). 
112. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 17, at 371; see also Mather & Levin, supra note 105.  
113. Nelson, supra note 33, at 780 (emphasis added). 
114. See Wendel, supra note 9, at 1171 (“[N]o matter how clear a rule appears to be, it will 
always be ambiguous enough to be manipulated.”). See generally Feldman, supra note 30, at 
885 (describing how technocratic lawyering interferes with ethical decision making). 
115. Suchman, supra note 101, at 844 (emphasis added). See also Levin, supra note 17, at 
369–71 (providing examples of small firm and individual practitioners who felt that there was a 
“disconnect” between the ethical rules and the “realities of practice”). 
116. Langevoort, supra note 66, at 22. 
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been independently disposed to undertake or to propose a particular course 
of unethical conduct may be more willing to do so when it is suggested by a 
client. 
1. The Role of the Lawyer’s Interests 
The interests of lawyer and client are often aligned and often favor 
ethical behavior. Specifically, lawyers and clients will generally share an 
interest in winning a case or negotiating a favorable deal.117 Lawyers have 
interests in seeing themselves as ethical legal professionals, in avoiding 
discipline, and in maintaining a good reputation.118 Clients, too, may have 
interests in behaving ethically.119 
But, lawyers also routinely face situations in which their interests come 
into conflict with clients’ interests and with their professional 
responsibilities. Lawyers’ judgments can be influenced by a myriad of 
desires—including the desire to satisfy the client, to make partner, to 
generate fees, to manage their own cash flow, to win a case, to achieve or 
maintain a particular reputation or status, to “do justice,” or to manage 
limited time.120 
These interests can influence the ways in which lawyers seek out and 
interpret information and generate arguments.121 There is a tendency to 
conflate what is fair or ethical with what serves one’s own interest, 
especially as there are many metrics by which one can judge fairness.122 
And, confirmation bias can lead us to interpret new information in ways 
that favor our existing beliefs and to ignore dissent or other indications of 
                                                                                                                            
117. Note that there are ethical limits on attorneys being too closely aligned with their 
client. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2010). 
118. See, e.g., Joshua E. Perry et al., The Ethical Health Lawyer: An Empirical Assessment 
of Moral Decision Making, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 461, 466 (2009). 
119. We recognize that clients may also have interests in behaving unethically, at least in 
the short run and as long as they don’t get caught. 
120. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The 
Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 412 (1997) 
(discussing how attorney self-interest might affect advice about risk); Suchman, supra note 101 
(describing the variety of interests that attorneys bring to ethical decision making). For a general 
discussion of how legal actors manage multiple, sometimes conflicting, interests, see Jennifer 
K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision Makers 
as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1153–54 (2003). 
121. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 
(1990). 
122. See Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value Will 
be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 137, 147 (1975). 
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ethical challenges.123 Thus, when an unethical course of action serves our 
interests, it may be easy to latch on to the particular metric that validates 
that course of action or to interpret the facts or the law in ways that are 
consistent with a judgment that the desired course of action is appropriate. 
“The ethical failure [then,] is not in the commitment to fairness but in the 
biased interpretation of information.”124 But because we tend to believe that 
we make decisions based on objective criteria—the illusion of objectivity—
it is difficult for us to recognize these effects.125 
Such interests can affect how attorneys bill their time, the factual and 
legal conclusions they draw, how they behave in negotiation, and the advice 
they give their clients. Consider, for example, the lawyers advising Enron, 
who “agreed to review the propriety of Enron transactions in which [the 
lawyers’] own services had been used.”126 It would not be surprising if the 
lawyers were motivated (consciously or unconsciously) to find that those 
prior transactions had been appropriate.127 Consider, too, how an attorney 
might feel the need to engage in puffing in order to land a particular client, 
how an attorney might be influenced by the desire to obtain or keep a client, 
or how an attorney’s desire for or fear of publicity might impact his 
representation of a client. 
Or think about how different billing arrangements might influence 
lawyer decision making.128 A lawyer who is paid by the hour might be 
inclined to spend more (conceivably unnecessary) time on a matter, be 
“aggressive rather than conservative” in billing his time, and have a 
                                                                                                                            
123. Scott Sonenshein, The Role of Construction, Intuition, and Justification in Responding 
to Ethical Issues at Work: The Sensemaking-Intuition Model, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1022, 
1029–30 (2007). See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous 
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998); Barbara O’Brien, Prime 
Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in 
Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 315, 315 (2009). 
124. Chugh et al., supra note 51, at 83; see also David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis, 
Fairness and Preference, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 418, 418 (1979). 
125. Armor, supra note 48, at 11–12. 
126. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1334 (2006). 
127. If the lawyers were to find that their own prior advice was improper, they might not 
only embarrass themselves but also expose themselves to possible legal liability. See Roger C. 
Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. 
LAW. 143, 164–66 (2002). 
128. See SUSAN SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE 
242–46 (2002); A.B.A. COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT 2001–2002, at 5 (2002), 
available at 
http://ilta.ebiz.uapps.net/productfiles/productfiles/914311/FMPG4_ABABillableHours2002.pdf; 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 193–95 
(1987). See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: 
What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1979–80 (2002).  
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tendency to be slow in settling his clients’ disputes.129 In contrast, a lawyer 
who is paid on a flat-fee or other fixed-rate basis might be inclined to 
minimize the amount of time devoted to the matter.130 And, while a lawyer 
working on a contingent fee may be motivated to spend time on the case in 
order to increase the amount of the verdict, settlement, or deal on which her 
fee will be based, she will only want to do so to the extent that such an 
increase is greater than her investment.131 In addition, the contingent fee 
attorney may be more likely to focus on the financial aspects of settlement 
which will impact her fee, rather than non-financial aspects which could 
benefit the client but not directly benefit the lawyer. 
Finally, consider the case of the lawyer who represented the plaintiff in a 
sexual harassment and discrimination suit.132 During a break in a deposition, 
plaintiff found a set of privileged documents belonging to the other side on 
a conference room table, read them, and removed them from the room.133 
Upon learning of his client’s action and unsure about how to respond, the 
lawyer began to interpret the facts in a favorable way (noting that the 
documents “were right in front of her” and were not marked “confidential”), 
to blame the other side (“they certainly knew how to handle documents”), 
and to read selectively prior case law (relying on a case involving the 
inadvertent delivery of privileged documents). He obtained a second 
opinion, but from someone who also had an interest in the outcome of the 
case. In all these ways, he convinced himself that the use of the documents 
was allowable.134 
                                                                                                                            
129. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using 
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 320 (1999); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing 
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
509, 531–33 (1994) (distinguishing between interests of firm, which may desire to keep client 
happy, and interests of individual attorney, who may have need to bill a large numbers of 
hours). 
130. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Practice, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 111, at 7. 
131. See Sternlight, supra note 129, at 327–28. 
132. ABEL, supra note 78, at 389. 
133. Id. 
134. The disciplinary authorities disagreed with the lawyer’s interpretation, ultimately 
finding him in violation of ethics rules. Id.; Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad 
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1549, 1570 (2009) (reviewing ABEL, supra note 78). 
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2. Conflicts and Disclosure 
Conflicts of interest can arise not only between attorneys and their 
clients, but also between the interests of multiple clients, or between current 
and future or former clients.135 While many believe that adequate disclosure 
of conflicts and consent thereto can help to address any potential 
problems,136 and while the Model Rules seem to be based on this 
assumption,137 recent research suggests that disclosure as a remedy is 
potentially problematic. 
Ideally, the disclosure of a conflicting interest permits the affected party 
to discount the conflicted party’s advice or opinion to account for the 
conflict.138 In practice, however, the affected party may not sufficiently 
discount the advice. 
First, although disclosure of a conflict of interest is likely to decrease 
trust in the advisor’s recommendation,139 the discounting that results may 
not be sufficient. Because we tend to underestimate the extent to which 
situational pressures influence the behavior of others, the client may 
underestimate the extent to which the conflict may have influenced the 
attorney’s advice.140 Further, even were the client to attempt to discount the 
conflicted advice, the client may have difficulty sufficiently adjusting away 
from the anchor provided by the advice141 and may find it difficult to ignore 
the advice once it has been proffered.142 Moreover, disclosure is also likely 
                                                                                                                            
135. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 289. 
136. See generally Omri Ben Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 649–50 (2011) (surveying the frequency of disclosure as 
remedy in a range of contexts). Note also that there are practical considerations involved in 
disclosing conflicts and asking for a waiver. See SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 376–92. 
137. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6–1.9 (2010) (allowing 
representation in some instances following disclosure and informed consent). 
138. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 18 (2010). A client deciding whether to retain a conflicted attorney 
might similarly discount the likely impact of the conflict and overestimate their ability to 
discount the advice given. 
139. See, e.g., Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of 
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5–6 (2005); Sunita Sah et al., The Burden 
of Disclosure: Increased Compliance with Distrusted Advice, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 289, 289 (2013). 
140. This tendency is known as the fundamental attribution error. See Edward E. Jones & 
Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 11 (1967). 
141. Anchors provide a starting point for a judgment; adjustments are then made away from 
the anchor, but these adjustments are often insufficient and result in judgments that are skewed 
toward the starting point. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES 3, 14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
142. Cain et al., supra note 139, at 6; see also Colin Camerer et al., The Curse of 
Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232, 1246–47 
(1989); Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: 
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to generate some countervailing degree of increased trust in the conflicted 
advisor in some cases. In particular, to the extent that the disclosure signals 
to the recipient that the attorney is attentive to potential conflicts and wants 
to address them with integrity, disclosure may make the advisor seem 
particularly forthright.143 
Even when trust in the recommendation is degraded, there may be 
increased pressure to act in accordance with the recommendation because 
the client does not want to signal her distrust of the advisor (insinuation 
anxiety).144 Wanting to be consistent in her own decision making,145 the 
client may also resist second guessing her original decision to consult the 
attorney and may compare the certain and immediate loss of the attorney’s 
assistance with the less certain and future consequences stemming from the 
conflict.146 
Further, in addition to the failure of clients to sufficiently take account of 
the potentially biasing effect of a conflict, attorneys’ disclosure of a conflict 
might actually increase the influence of the conflict on attorney judgments 
and actions. Research has found that behaving ethically at one point in time 
can result in less ethical behavior at a later point in time by establishing the 
moral credentials of the actor in her own mind and licensing her to behave 
less ethically later.147 This is consistent with research finding that an 
                                                                                                                            
Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 437 (1997). 
Legal fact-finders have similar difficulties in ignoring inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., Mark 
Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 301–03 
(1996); Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of 
Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
113, 124–25 (1994); William C. Thompson et al., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 453 (1981); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges 
Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1251, 1253–58 (2005). 
143. See Sah et al., supra note 139, at 290; see also Steven D. Pearson et al., A Trial of 
Disclosing Physicians’ Financial Incentives to Patients, 166 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 623, 626 
(2006); Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust, 
23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393, 399 (1998) (explaining the development of relational trust). 
144. Sah et al., supra note 139, at 290. 
145. See CIALDINI, supra note 64, at 52 (describing the pressure for consistency). 
146. See Leonard E. Gross, Are Differences Among the Attorney Conflict of Interest Rules 
Consistent with the Principles of Behavioral Economics?, 19 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 111, 114 
(2006); Cameron & Miller, supra note 86, at 91–101 (discussing loss aversion). 
147. Dale T. Miller & Daniel A. Effron, Psychological License: When It Is Needed and 
How It Functions, 43 ADVS. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (2010); Benoît Monin & Dale 
T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 33, 34 (2001); see also Anna C. Merritt et al., The Strategic Pursuit of Moral 
Credentials, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 774, 774 (2012). It is possible that acceptance 
of routine disclosure as a remedy for conflicts might license the profession as a whole to believe 
that they have effectively dealt with conflicts situations. See George Loewenstein et al., The 
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individual who discloses a conflict may actually give more biased advice 
than the attorney who does not disclose—a process known as disclosure 
distortion.148 
3. Acting Unethically Indirectly—Through and On Behalf of 
Others 
Another complication that flows from the agency relationship between 
attorney and client relates to the omission bias—the tendency to prefer 
options that entail inaction to options that require action.149 Because harms 
caused indirectly entail less moral intensity than harms inflicted directly, 
people tend to be more willing to engage in unethical conduct when acting 
through an agent than when acting for themselves.150 For example, in one 
variant of the Milgram shock experiments in which the study participant 
relied on another person to administer the shock151 over 90% of participants 
administered the highest shock, as compared to “only” 63% of solo 
participants who themselves had to shock a person in the next room and 
30% of participants who had to directly place the other’s hand on a plate to 
                                                                                                                            
Unintended Consequences of Conflict of Interest Disclosures, 307 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 669, 669 
(2012) (applying this literature to conflicts of interest in the medical profession). 
148. Cain et al., supra note 139, at 13; Daylian Cain et al., When Sunlight Fails to 
Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 37 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 836, 841 (2011); see Daylian M. Cain et al., Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier: 
The Shortcomings of Disclosure as a Solution to Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 
supra note 51, at 104; George Loewenstein et al., The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and 
Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 101 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 423, 
424 (2011); Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 190–91. 
149. See generally Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475, 475 (1994); Mark Spranca et al., 
Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 76, 
78–79 (1991). 
150. Lucas C. Coffman, Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward), 3 AM. ECON. 
J.: MICROECON. 77, 78 (2011); Neeru Paharia et al., Dirty Work, Clean Hands: The Moral 
Psychology of Indirect Agency, 109 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
134, 134 (2009). Harms caused indirectly also tend to be punished less severely. Id. at 141; see 
also Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility 2 
(Univ. of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Working Paper No. 380,  
2008), available at www.iew.uzh.ch/wp/iewwp380.pdf; Edward B. Royzman & Jonathan 
Baron, The Preference for Indirect Harm, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 165, 182 (2002). See generally 
Jason Dana et al., Ethical Immunity: How People Violate Their Own Moral Standards Without 
Feeling They Are Doing So, in BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS: SHAPING AN EMERGING FIELD 
201 (David De Cremer & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 2012). 
151. See supra Section I.B. 
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administer the shock.152 Clients, similarly, may be more willing to have their 
attorneys act unethically on their behalf than they would be to themselves 
engage in a particular unethical act. Indeed, some clients may hold a 
schema153 or mental representation for “lawyer” that inclines them to make 
such proposals.154 
At the same time, because people tend to be more willing to endorse an 
unfair proposal suggested by someone else than they would be to originate 
such a suggestion themselves,155 lawyers may be more willing to approve a 
client’s proposed unethical course of action than they would be to initiate 
such a course. One recent study examined the extent to which attorneys 
would disclose a material but damaging piece of information that had come 
to their attention on the eve of reaching a favorable settlement agreement. 
One of the primary justifications given by lawyers who chose not to 
disclose was that their client did not want them to divulge the 
information.156 While, legally, the fact that nondisclosure was requested by 
the client does not justify the attorney’s action,157  
the principal may feel more detached, and hence less responsible, 
for such an action if it is delegated, while the agent may feel that 
he or she was “just carrying out orders” . . . . Through the use of 
agents, therefore, accountability for morally questionable behavior 
can become vertically diffused, with no individual taking 
responsibility.
158
 
Finally, psychologists have found that people are more willing to engage 
in unethical conduct when they believe such conduct will benefit another 
                                                                                                                            
152. MILGRAM, supra note 61, at 119–22. 
153. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 76 (1991) 
(defining “schema”). 
154. Levin, supra note 17, at 339 (reporting the comments of one lawyer: “There’s an 
expectation that people have that you are going to lie for them. That you’re going to make up 
things for them. That that’s expected of them.”). 
155. Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: 
Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 10, 17 (2006) (describing 
Kristina A. Diekmann et al., Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation: 
Allocators Versus Recipients, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061, 1072 (1997)); Paharia 
et al., supra note 150, at 141. This willingness to endorse another’s unethical suggestions is in 
step with norms that “assign[] ultimate responsibility for the moral content of a client’s position 
to the client himself,” rather than to the attorney as agent. Austin Sarat, Ethics in Litigation: 
Rhetoric of Crisis, Realities of Practice, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 111, at 149. 
156. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 11, at 125; see also Levin, supra note 17, at 338–40 
(discussing lawyers requested to do things by “bad” clients). 
157. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 11, at 123–25. 
158. John R. Hamman et al., Self-Interest Through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for 
the Principal-Agent Relationship, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1826, 1826 (2010). 
  
 
 
 
1136 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
person.159 For example, questionable actions in discovery might be seen as 
more appropriate when done to benefit a client one sees as being 
“railroaded,” or a conflict of interest might be ignored to spare a client 
added expense. Thus, lawyers may be more inclined to engage in unethical 
acts they believe will benefit clients than they would be to engage in the 
same behavior to benefit themselves alone.160 
4. Benefits of Agency Relationship 
While we have seen that agency relationships can create ethical 
difficulties for attorneys, attorney-client relationships can also serve as a 
check on ethics. First, as we have noted, attorneys will not share all of their 
clients’ interests—and attorneys have their own interests in avoiding 
censure. This different perspective on clients’ decisions may allow the 
attorney to see the ethical contours of a decision that have faded for the 
client. Similarly, to the extent that an attorney has only periodic 
involvement with a client, the attorney may be in a position to notice shifts 
in practice that are not noticeable to a client who sees only the more 
incremental changes. That is, the attorney may be better positioned to notice 
the client’s slide down the slippery slope. In addition, harmful behavior is 
less likely in the presence of a dissenter.161 Thus, developing a relationship 
in which attorney and client are able to effectively express dissent can mean 
that each can serve as an ethical check for the other. And, finally, to the 
extent that searching analysis is part of our basic understanding of or 
schema for attorneys, a client may be more receptive to the questioning of 
                                                                                                                            
159. See, e.g., Francecsa Gino & Lamar Pierce, Dishonesty in the Name of Equity, 20 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1153, 1159 (2009); Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Lying to Level the Playing 
Field: Why People May Dishonestly Help or Hurt Others to Create Equity, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 
89, 101 (2010); Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based 
Discrimination in Illicit Customer Help, 21 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI. 1176, 1189 (2010); Scott S. 
Wiltermuth, Cheating More When the Spoils are Split, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 157, 166–67 (2011). 
160. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice As Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 225, 243 (2006) (“The lawyers bought into an understanding of Enron as a valiant 
corporate renegade, looking to manipulate the system in furtherance of the greater corporate 
good.”); Michael Powell & Lois Romano, Roman Catholic Church Shifts Legal Strategy: 
Aggressive Litigation Replaces Quiet Settlements, WASH. POST, May 13, 2002, at A1 
(discussing attorneys for Catholic priests accused of sexual abuse “fighting to keep documents 
secret and engaging in new tactics to minimize settlements,” so as to defend “good priests”). 
161. See, e.g., MILGRAM, supra note 61, at 116; see also Solomon E. Asch, Studies of 
Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. 
MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1, 2 (1956). 
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her plans or activities that comes from her attorney than to similar critique 
from another source. 
C. The Challenges of the Adversarial System 
To advocate for a client’s interests implies some level of partisanship. 
Both litigators and transactional attorneys often represent parties with 
opposed positions and lawyers representing regulated entities can also come 
to see regulators as their adversaries.162 
Many ethical issues arise in this adversarial context. In the service of 
“zealous advocacy,”163 attorneys may fail to ask their client important or 
probing questions, fail to disclose material information to an opponent, 
exaggerate claims, dissemble about alternative deals, coach rather than 
prepare witnesses, aggressively cross-examine even candid witnesses, and 
so on. Indeed, some lawyers view “an ability to push the ethical envelope 
[as] a source of pride, rather than an embarrassing confession of 
susceptibility to temptation.”164 In this view, “cautious punctiliousness [is] 
at least as ethically troubling as venturesome zeal.”165 The structure of 
attorneys’ relationships with their clients can sometimes mean that attorneys 
are ethically obligated to behave in ways that would be viewed as unethical 
in other contexts.166 But, the adversary system can also incline lawyers take 
                                                                                                                            
162. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 66, at 22 (“Where a loyalty to the corporate mission 
comes to color the lawyers’ thinking, it becomes easy to start thinking of regulators and the 
courts as rivals.”). 
163. Although the Model Rules were revised in 2002 to make “zealous advoca[cy]” part of 
the preamble, rather than part of the Rules, many attorneys continue to believe and act as if 
“zealous advocacy” is required in all circumstances. The comment to Rule 1.3, requiring 
“reasonable diligence,” makes clear however that “zeal” is limited by ethics and professional 
discretion.  
164. Suchman, supra note 101, at 854 (“Zealous advocacy was, to them, an affirmative 
moral obligation, even when it came into conflict with other ethical rules.”); Wendel, supra note 
9, at 1170 (recounting how long-time Enron attorneys defended their behavior as “creative and 
aggressive” structuring of transactions for the benefit of their client). 
165. Suchman, supra note 101, at 854. 
166. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 710 (noting that “much of what is characterized as 
aggressive or ‘hardball’ behavior is legitimate and functional in view of valid litigation 
objectives and the conventional norms of the adversary game”); see also, e.g., People v. Belge, 
376 N.Y.S.2d 771, 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (holding that attorney-client privilege exempted 
attorney from duty to report death occurring without medical attendance); Adam Liptak, When 
Law Prevents Righting A Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, at WK4; Slayer’s 2 Lawyers Kept 
Secret of 2 More Killings, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1974, at 81. 
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this zealousness too far and to “treat[] behavior that would be ethically 
problematic in other contexts as not problematic.”167 
Consider how an adversarial mindset might have influenced John 
Gellene as he considered whether to disclose his ties to South Street and 
Salovaara in the Bucyrus bankruptcy: 
In the moral calculus that likely had emerged for Gellene 
during [the bankruptcy] negotiations, [disclosure] would mean that 
the party [(JNL)] that had behaved so unreasonably during the past 
year would gain the upper hand. The debtor would have to hire 
new counsel. That counsel would have to spend valuable time 
becoming familiar with Bucyrus, the other parties, and the plan. 
Furthermore, JNL undoubtedly would use this disruption as an 
opportunity to push for drastic changes in the plan. . . . Given the 
hostility of other parties to JNL, the result might be a bloody mess 
that would leave Bucyrus beyond repair. 
For these reasons, Gellene may have convinced himself 
that non-disclosure not only was not morally blameworthy, but 
that it was morally justified. . . . Disclosure would do little to add 
to the integrity of the bankruptcy process, but could seriously 
undermine the chance for a timely and successful 
reorganization.
168
 
Acting in a way that would provide an advantage to an opponent may 
have been unthinkable. 
Consider, too, that approaching a conflict or negotiation from a 
competitive perspective tends to increase unethical behavior.169 Similarly, 
we tend to evaluate behavior as being more ethical when we believe that we 
are acting in response to unfair behavior by another.170 These findings are 
consistent, for example, with many lawyers’ views of the discovery process: 
                                                                                                                            
167. Sarat, supra note 155, at 149; see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 156 
(1930) (“Why should you expect the ethics of the game to be different from the game itself?”). 
168. REGAN, supra note 13, at 347–48 (emphasis added). 
169. Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on 
Motivation and Behavior, 111 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 139, 139 
(2010); Maurice E. Schweitzer et al., Conflict Frames and the Use of Deception: Are 
Competitive Negotiators Less Ethical?, 35 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2123, 2140 (2005); 
Wolfgang Steinel & Carsten K.W. De Dreu, Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in 
Social Decision Making, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 419, 431 (2004); see also Gillian 
Ku et al., Towards a Competitive Arousal Model of Decision-Making: A Study of Auction Fever 
in Live and Internet Auctions, 96 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 89, 
101–02 (2005). 
170. Maurice E. Schweitzer & Donald E. Gibson, Fairness, Feelings, and Ethical Decision-
Making: Consequences of Violating Community Standards of Fairness, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 287, 
298 (2008). 
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A question I have often asked lawyers is this: If the other 
side does it, can you retaliate? The legal answer is no. The federal 
rule against discovery abuse (Rule 26) does not have a “they 
started it!” exception. But many lawyers think that if the other side 
starts playing discovery games, they would be hurting their clients 
to turn the other cheek.
171
 
The tendency to assess the propriety of questionable negotiation tactics 
more positively when they are described as responses to a questionable 
tactic used by the other side172 can be particularly pernicious when 
combined with our tendency to attribute bias or unfairness to those with 
whom we simply disagree.173 
Consider how all of this might influence a prosecutor’s application of 
Brady v. Maryland.174 Brady requires the prosecution to disclose evidence 
that is favorable to the defense when it “could reasonably be taken to put 
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the 
verdict.”175 In particular, 
Brady requires a prosecutor who is determining whether to 
disclose a piece of evidence to the defense to speculate first about 
how the remaining evidence will come together against the 
defendant at trial, and then about whether a reasonable probability 
exists that the piece of evidence at issue would affect the result of 
the trial. During the first step, a risk exists that prosecutors will 
engage in biased recall, retrieving from memory only those facts 
that tend to confirm the hypothesis of guilt. Moreover, because of 
selective information processing, the prosecutor will accept at face 
value the evidence she views as inculpatory, without subjecting it 
to the scrutiny that a defense attorney would encourage jurors to 
apply. 
Cognitive bias would also appear to taint the second 
speculative step of the Brady analysis, requiring the prosecutor to 
                                                                                                                            
171. David Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND POLICY 60 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006). 
Many litigated discovery disputes involve allegations by all parties about their opponents’ bad 
behavior. See, e.g., 6 Michael B. Keating, BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL 
COURTS § 66:8 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2012); see also Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer 
Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1630 (1996). 
172. Stephen M. Garcia et al., Morally Questionable Tactics: Negotiations Between District 
Attorneys and Public Defenders, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 731, 739 (2001). 
173. Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, When Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions of 
Bias and the Escalation of Conflict, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 833, 845 (2008). 
174. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
175. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 675 (1985). 
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determine the value of the potentially exculpatory evidence in the 
context of the entire record. Because of selective information 
processing, the prosecutor will look for weaknesses in evidence 
contradicting her existing belief in the defendant’s guilt. In short, 
compared to a neutral decision maker, the prosecutor will 
overestimate the strength of the government’s case against the 
defendant and underestimate the potential exculpatory value of the 
evidence whose disclosure is at issue. As a consequence, the 
prosecutor will fail to see materiality where it might in fact 
exist.
176
  
D. The Tolls of Law Practice 
Long hours, deadlines, and workplace politics can combine to take a toll 
on lawyers, as can lack of sleep, frequent interruptions, travel, difficult 
decisions, and the struggle to balance work and family life.177 In Eat What 
You Kill, Regan describes John Gellene as working in an “environment of 
constant urgency” in which getting five hours of sleep was thought to be a 
“luxury.” Gellene did not sleep at all during the two days leading up to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition and the application for appointment as 
Bucyrus’ counsel, two days that were described as being “‘a circus,’ with 
people running around, papers flying, and a large group of lawyers, legal 
assistants, and financial advisors turning the Bucyrus board room into 
command central. The stress on everyone was palpable.”178 
These sorts of job stresses impact ethical decision making. In a classic 
study on time pressures, seminary students were assigned to give a three to 
five minute impromptu talk in an adjacent building. Some students were 
                                                                                                                            
176. Burke, supra note 33, at 1611–12 (2006). It is also worth noting that there are 
circumstances in which it is good rapport, rather than an adversarial relationship, that puts one 
at risk of engaging in unethical behavior.  In particular, one recent study demonstrated that 
“negotiators seeking to build or maintain rapport may be more likely to deceive their partners 
than to disappoint them with the truth.” Sandy D. Jap et al., The Dark Side of Rapport: Agent 
Misbehavior Face-to-Face and Online, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1610, 1612 (2011). 
177. See, e.g., Janine Robben, Burnout: Cautionary Tales, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL. 16, 22–24 
(2008), available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/08oct/burnout.html; see also 
Public Defender v. Florida, 115 So. 3d 261, 285 (Fla. 2013), available at 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2013/sc09-1181.pdf (finding that excessive 
workloads justified withdrawal by public defenders from an array of cases); JEAN WALLACE, 
JUGGLING IT ALL: A STUDY OF LAWYERS’ WORK, HOME, AND FAMILY DEMANDS AND COPING 
STRATEGIES, REPORT OF STAGE 2 FINDINGS 12–15 (2004); Stephanie Francis Ward, The 
Ultimate Time-Money Trade-Off, 93 A.B.A. J. 24, 24–25 (2007); Mary Flood, New Lawyers 
Say, ‘Pay Us Less, Don’t Work Us So Hard’, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 16, 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/flood/4714709.html.  
178. REGAN, supra note 13, at 134. 
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told that they were late for their turn to talk; others were led to believe they 
had more time. On the way to the other building each student encountered a 
person in need of help—a person planted by the researchers: “the victim 
was sitting slumped in a doorway, head down, eyes closed, not moving. As 
the subject went by, the victim coughed twice and groaned, keeping his 
head down.” Those participants who were in a hurry were significantly less 
likely to stop to help than were those who were less rushed.179 More recent 
research has found that time pressure also results in a greater likelihood of 
lying.180 
Studies have also found that unethical decisions are more common when 
the decision maker suffers from a lack of sleep or is otherwise cognitively 
taxed.181 And, the process of making decisions, being deprived of food, and 
even resisting the desire to snack can also result in cognitive depletion.182 
When a decision maker’s cognitive resources have already been challenged, 
the decision maker is more likely to put himself in temptation’s way and 
then succumb to that temptation.183 Depleted individuals are also less likely 
                                                                                                                            
179. John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A Study of 
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 100, 104 (1973). Interestingly, participants who were assigned to speak about the 
parable of the “Good Samaritan”—a story about helping someone in need—were no more likely 
to stop to help than those assigned to speak about another topic. Id. 
180. Shalvi et al., Honesty Requires Time, supra note 79, at 1265. 
181. See, e.g., Christopher M. Barnes et al., Lack of Sleep and Unethical Conduct, 115 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 169, 178 (2011); Michael S. Christian 
& Aleksander P.J. Ellis, Examining the Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Workplace Deviance: A 
Self-Regulatory Perspective, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 913, 926 (2011); Francesca Gino et al., Unable 
to Resist Temptation: How Self-Control Depletion Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 191, 199 (2011); Nicole L. Mead et al., 
Too Tired to Tell the Truth: Self-Control Resource Depletion and Dishonesty, 45 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 594, 596 (2009); Mark Muraven et al., Self-Control Depletion 
and the General Theory of Crime, 22 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 263, 273 (2006); see also 
William D.S. Kilgore et al., The Effects of 53 Hours of Sleep Deprivation on Moral Judgment, 
30 SLEEP 345, 350 (2007). 
182. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?, 74 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1252, 1263 (1998); Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in 
Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889, 6890 (2011) (finding more generous 
parole board decisions when board members were well fed); Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Making 
Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, 
Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 883, 897 (2008). 
President Barack Obama has eliminated all suits that are neither gray nor blue, so that he need 
not expend cognitive energy making clothing choices. Obama says: “I’m trying to pare down 
decisions. I don’t want to make decisions about what I’m eating or wearing. Because I have too 
many other decisions to make.” Michael Lewis, Obama’s Way, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2012, at 216, 
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/10/michael-lewis-profile-barack-obama.  
183. Mead et al., supra note 181, at 596.  
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to recognize the moral dimensions of decisions184 and experience less 
guilt.185 Making matters worse, decision makers do not anticipate these 
effects on decision making.186 
At the same time, these unfortunate forces can be countered. There is 
evidence that decision makers who recognize the need for self-control, and 
who are motivated to exercise that control, may be able to temper the 
depleting effects of cognitive strain.187 Other research has found that those 
who believe that their willpower is a non-limited resource are less likely to 
show decreased performance following a demanding task.188 
Finally, some of the most common sorts of ethical failures—such as poor 
client communication, the neglect of client matters, overbilling, or abuse of 
client trust funds—can stem in part from the economic pressures of law 
practice.189 For example, a lawyer or firm may feel economic pressure to 
accept cases that would be better declined. A lawyer may succumb to the 
planning fallacy, overconfidently believing that he can competently handle 
another case, and then find himself overwhelmed.190 A lawyer may decide 
to engage in advertising that she otherwise finds disagreeable in order to 
generate scarce business.191 Or, a lawyer who is surviving hand-to-mouth 
may begin her slide down the slippery slope when she is tempted to 
“borrow” from client accounts or to co-mingle funds—just a little bit, for 
just a little while—in order to deal with perceived temporary cash flow 
                                                                                                                            
184. Gino et al., supra note 181, at 199. 
185. Hanyi Xu et al., Too Fatigued to Care: Ego Depletion, Guilt, and Prosocial Behavior, 
48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1183, 1185 (2012). 
186. Mead et al., supra note 181, at 596. 
187. See Michael Inzlicht & Brandon J. Schmeichel, What Is Ego Depletion? Toward a 
Mechanistic Revision of the Resource Model of Self-Control, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 450, 
459 (2012) (reviewing studies); Mark Muraven & Elisaveta Slessareva, Mechanisms of Self-
Control Failure: Motivation and Limited Resources, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
894, 905 (2003) (finding that motivation moderates depletion effects). 
188. Joshua J. Clarkson et al., When Perception is More Than Reality: The Effects of 
Perceived Versus Actual Resource Depletion on Self-Regulatory Behavior, 98 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 45 (2010); Veronika Job et al., Ego Depletion—Is It All in Your Head?: 
Implicit Theories About Willpower Affect Self-Regulation, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1686, 1692 (2010). 
189. For a discussion of the changing economics of legal practice, see Gordon, supra note 
27, at 717–18; Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second 
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1913 (2008). As part of this 
transformation, the relationship between in-house and outside counsel has changed as well. See 
Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client 
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 543–44 (1985). 
190. Buehler et al., supra note 49, at 2. 
191. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers and the Tension 
between Professional Norms and the Need to Generate Business, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: 
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 118 (highlighting one lawyer’s 
belief that a failure to use the same tactics as others forfeits business to those that do). 
  
 
 
 
45:1107] BEHAVIORAL LEGAL ETHICS 1143 
problems.192 Even attorneys at the largest and most prestigious firms feel 
serious financial pressure to try to maintain or build their reputation as 
being highly profitable.193 
E. Status and Power 
In addition to being a demanding profession, lawyering also tends to be a 
relatively high status profession and lawyers may frequently perceive 
themselves to be more powerful than others, such as clients.194 Attorneys 
may also draw power in particular situations (such as a negotiation) from 
their possession of private information or an attractive alternative.195 Thus, 
while attorneys will not always be more powerful than others with whom 
they interact and will vary in the degree to which they occupy positions of 
status or power, they may regularly find themselves functioning from a 
position of perceived status, power, or strength.  
All this matters for attorney ethics because social status tends to be 
negatively associated with ethics, with those in higher status positions 
tending to engage in more unethical behavior.196 There is even evidence that 
simply conceiving of the self as a professional—which entails a belief in 
one’s technical and ethical competence—is associated with unethical 
behavior.197 In addition, people who feel powerful can be more likely to 
                                                                                                                            
192. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 17, at 359. 
193. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm 
for Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 31 (2000). 
194. See, e.g., Keiko Nakao & Judith Treas, Updating Occupational Prestige and 
Socioeconomic Scores: How the New Measures Measure Up, 24 SOC. METHODOLOGY 1, 48 
(1994); Gillian Stevens & David L. Featherman, A Revised Socioeconomic Index of 
Occupational Status, 10 SOC. SCI. RES. 364, 383 (1981); Robert M. Hauser & John Robert 
Warren, Socioeconomic Indexes for Occupations: A Review, Update, and Critique app. A at 5, 
(Ctr. Demography & Ecology, Working Paper No. 96-01, 1996). A recent Harris Poll reported 
that 81% of respondents felt lawyers have “some” to “very great prestige.” Firefighters, 
Scientists and Doctors Seen as Most Prestigious Occupations, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Aug. 4, 
2009), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Pres-
Occupations-2009-08.pdf. 
195. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Power Asymmetries and the Ethical 
Atmosphere in Negotiations, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 
209 (John M. Darley et al. eds., 2001). 
196. Paul K. Piff et al., Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior, 109 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4086, 4088 (2012); see also Bella L. Galperin et al., Status 
Differentiation and the Protean Self: A Social-Cognitive Model of Unethical Behavior in 
Organizations, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 407, 416 (2011). 
197. Maryam Kouchaki, Professionalism and Moral Behavior: Does a Professional Self-
Conception Make One More Unethical? 37 (Edmond J. Safra Res. Lab Working Papers, Paper 
No. 4, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243811. 
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engage in unethical behaviors such as cheating.198 Power tends to make 
people more attuned to the attraction of rewards, feel more entitled, be more 
goal directed, be more overconfident, and be less concerned about social 
censure than are those who feel more powerless.199 
In addition, more powerful people tend to be less likely to take the 
perspective or feel the emotions of another person. In particular, powerful 
people are less likely to take into account another person’s visual 
perspective, less likely to adjust for the fact that others lack access to their 
private information, and are less accurate at identifying emotions in 
others.200 Predictably, less empathy or understanding of the emotions of 
another is associated with more unethical behavior.201 And, for lawyers, 
such difficulties in reading others may result in a failure to attend to the 
needs of clients and lead to ethical violations such as a failure to 
communicate. 
While feeling powerful can increase unethical behavior, powerful people 
may be more protected than are others against at least one set of pressures. 
To the extent that powerful people are less concerned about social censure 
or other situational pressures, they may be better able to resist conforming 
to unethical social norms.202 In addition, power tends to increase the focus 
                                                                                                                            
198. Joris Lammers et al., Power Increases Hypocrisy: Moralizing in Reasoning, 
Immorality in Behavior, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 737, 742 (2010); see also Terry L. Boles et al., 
Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining, 83 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 235, 237 (2000); Helmut Crott et al., The Effects of Information 
Exchange and Communication in an Asymmetrical Negotiation Situation, 10 EUR. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 149, 160 (1980). Ironically, powerful people tend to judge others more harshly for 
unethical conduct. Lammers et al., supra. 
199. See, e.g., Nathaneal J. Fast et al., Power and Overconfident Decision-Making, 117 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 249, 257 (2012); Ana Guinote, Power 
and Goal Pursuit, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1076, 1084 (2007); Dacher Keltner 
et al., Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 265, 279 (2003); Lammers et al., 
supra note 198, at 738; Deepak Malhotra & Francesca Gino, The Pursuit of Power Corrupts: 
How Investing in Outside Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships, 56 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
559, 563 (2011). People in more powerful roles may also be “buffered” from feeling the effects 
of unethical behavior. See, e.g., Dana R. Carney et al., How Power Corrupts: Power Buffers the 
Emotional, Cognitive, and Physiological Stress of Lying 20 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Haas Sch. 
of Bus. Research Grant, 2011–2016, 2011), 
http://mors.haas.berkeley.edu/papers/Carney.HowPowerCorrupts.pdf. 
200. Adam D. Galinsky et al., Power and Perspectives Not Taken, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1068, 
1072 (2006). 
201. See Taya R. Cohen, Moral Emotions and Unethical Bargaining: The Differential 
Effects of Empathy and Perspective Taking in Deterring Deceitful Negotiation, 94 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 569, 576 (2010). 
202. See Adam D. Galinsky et al., Power Reduces the Press of the Situation: Implications 
for Creativity, Conformity, and Dissonance, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1450, 1462 
(2008). It also seems to be the case that power asymmetries can result in unethical behavior by 
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on salient goals. To the extent that these focal goals are strongly linked to 
ethical or cooperative behavior, more ethical conduct may be expected.203 
F. Lawyers as Social Actors 
No dilemma causes [students] more anxiety than the 
prospect of being pressured by their boss to do something 
unethical. Not only do they worry about losing their jobs if they 
defy the boss to do the right thing, they also fear that the pressures 
of the situation might undermine their ability to know what the 
right thing is.
204
 
These students are right to be worried.  
First, recall the Milgram studies in which people followed the 
instructions of an authoritative experimenter to administer increasingly 
severe shocks to another person.205 These studies make evident “that each of 
us ought to believe three things about ourselves: that we disapprove of 
destructive obedience, that we think we would never engage in it, and more 
likely than not, that we are wrong to think we would never engage in it.”206 
In the context of legal practice, the influence of authority can come in the 
form of a more senior lawyer, a colleague, or a client.207 
                                                                                                                            
either the more powerful or the weaker party. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 195, at 
210. 
203. See Jacob B. Hirsh, Adam D. Galinsky, & Chen-Bo Zhong, Drunk, Powerful, and in 
the Dark: How General Processes of Disinhibition Produce Both Prosocial and Antisocial 
Behavior, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 415, 418 (2011); see also Stéphane Côté et al., Social 
Power Facilitates the Effect of Prosocial Orientation on Empathic Accuracy, 101 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 217, 217 (2011). For discussion of the ways in which different 
dimensions of social class may influence ethical behavior in different ways, see Stefan T. 
Trautmann et al., Social Class and (Un)Ethical Behavior: A Framework, With Evidence From a 
Large Population Sample, 8 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 487 (2013). 
204. David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ 
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 111, at 94–95. 
205. See MILGRAM, supra note 61. 
206. Luban, supra note 204, at 97 (emphasis omitted); see also Perlman, supra note 33; 
Kim, supra note 9; KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 65. For examples from other professions, 
see Annamarie Krackow & Thomas Blass, When Nurses Obey or Defy Inappropriate Physician 
Orders: Attributional Differences, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 585, 585 (1995); Eugen 
Tarnow, Self-Destructive Obedience in the Airplane Cockpit and the Concept of Obedience 
Optimization, in OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE MILGRAM 
PARADIGM 111 (Thomas Blass ed., 2000). 
207. See, e.g., Eldred, supra note 25, at 354–55 (describing pressure from superiors on 
public defenders to handle more cases); Perlman, supra note 33, at 451 (describing associate 
told not to produce documents within scope of discovery request). Young lawyers or lawyers 
who lack mobility may be particularly susceptible in this regard. Psychological research has 
found that those who are more dependent upon an organization are more likely to engage in 
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While the rules of professional responsibility do not allow a lawyer who 
acts “at the direction of another person” to escape responsibility for ethical 
misconduct, the rules do provide that a “subordinate lawyer does not violate 
the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a 
supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of 
professional duty.”208 Given all that we know about ethical blindspots, it 
would not be surprising if subordinate lawyers had difficulty making 
objective judgments about whether a question is “arguable” and about the 
“reasonableness” of the superior’s resolution. And, as we have discussed, 
lawyers are skilled at making arguments on multiple sides of an issue.209 
Thus, when a partner tells an associate to do something the associate 
initially finds ethically questionable, the associate may well be able to craft 
an argument to convince himself that the particular behavior is acceptable. 
Even in the absence of directions from an authority, ethical behavior can 
be influenced by other people. We learn how to comport ourselves, in part, 
by watching the actions of those around us, looking to see how others—
particularly those with more experience or expertise—behave.210 “[L]awyers 
are social beings; like other human beings in social and occupational 
groups, lawyers behave largely in accordance with group norms.”211 For 
attorneys this might be other lawyers within a firm or agency, lawyers who 
share space, or other formal or informal advice networks—their 
“communities of practice.”212 The more widespread an attorney believes a 
                                                                                                                            
compliant unethical behaviors. See, e.g., Judy Wahn, Organizational Dependence and the 
Likelihood of Complying with Organizational Pressures to Behave Unethically, 12 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 245, 248 (1993). 
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2010). 
209. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
210. See, e.g., ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 27 (Erik Gilg ed., 11th ed. 2012); 
Bibb Latané & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies, 10 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 220 (1968); see also MUZAFER SHERIF, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 84–85 (1936); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: 
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL 221 (2007) (describing the Stanford Prison 
Experiment); Asch, supra note 161, at 70; Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates 
of Social Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 
245, 251 (2005) (examining the effects of conformity and independence on brain activity); 
Michael J. O’Fallon & Kenneth D. Butterfield, The Influence of Unethical Peer Behavior on 
Observers’ Unethical Behavior: A Social Cognitive Perspective, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 117, 126 
(2012). 
211. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for 
Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 27 (2000). 
212. LYNN M. MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF 
PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 41 (2001) (describing communities of practice and their effects); 
Lynn Mather, How and Why Do Lawyers Misbehave? Lawyers, Discipline, and Collegial 
Control, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 
109, 116 (Scott L. Cummings ed., 2011) (reviewing empirical literature on different 
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particular practice is, the more likely he is to indicate that he would engage 
in it213 and the more tempting the unethical behavior, the more widespread 
he will believe it to be.214 
When [lawyers] begin work at law firms, they watch the more 
experienced lawyers to see what the real standards of conduct are. 
Each firm quickly communicates its institutional norms to new 
associates; many associates are anxious to assimilate themselves 
into an institution and to be successful within it. Therefore, they 
are not critical of the norms they are asked to adopt. They redraw 
their lines to fit into the value systems of their firms. If the senior 
lawyers are not precise in their billing practices, the junior lawyers 
will not be. If the senior lawyers exaggerate their credentials or 
expertise when talking with new clients, the junior lawyers will do 
the same.
215
 
We are particularly influenced by others who we consider to be members 
of our group. Studies have found that observing an in-group peer acting 
unethically increases the likelihood that the observer will similarly act 
unethically.216 When someone with whom one shares similarities (even the 
same name or birthday, let alone the same profession or firm) acts 
unethically, we judge their behavior as less unethical and feel greater 
distance from our own moral compass.217 The Milgram studies also show 
                                                                                                                            
communities of practice); see also Elizabeth Chambliss, Whose Ethics? The Benchmark 
Problem in Legal Ethics Research, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN 
CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 47, 48 (describing the “ethical learning” that takes place as 
“lawyers gradually acquire specialized ethical expertise”); Leslie C. Levin, Specialty Bars as a 
Site of Professionalism: The Immigration Bar Example, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 194, 196–97 
(2011) (describing communication of professional norms within specialty bars). The Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct point lawyers to “the approbation of professional peers” as a 
source of ethical guidance. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE AND SCOPE (2010). 
213. See, e.g., Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 11, at 150. 
214. Tenbrunsel, supra note 54, at 336. 
215. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 681 (1990); see JEROME E. 
CARLIN, LAWYERS ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 116–17 (1966); see also 
Kirkland, supra note 33, at 691; Levin, supra note 17, at 322; Nelson, supra note 189, at 527; 
Suchman, supra note 101, at 860–61. 
216. Francesca Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The 
Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 397 (2009). In contrast, 
“observing an out-group peer engaging in unethical behavior reduced participants’ likelihood of 
acting unethically themselves.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Francesca Gino et al., Contagion 
or Restitution? When Bad Apples Can Motivate Good Behavior, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1299, 1301 (2009) (finding that seeing a member of one’s in-group act unethically 
can trigger compensatory ethical behavior when an out-group member is present). 
217. Francesca Gino & Adam D. Galinsky, Vicarious Dishonesty: When Psychological 
Closeness Creates Distance From One’s Moral Compass, 119 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
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the importance of social norms—when participants worked together with a 
(confederate) peer who administered the shocks, compliance reached over 
90%. But when peers refused to comply, compliance dropped to 10%.218 
When a lawyer is discomfited by what he sees, he may struggle to make 
sense of and justify that conduct. For example, David Luban describes an 
associate who observed a senior litigator lie to an opponent about a 
discovery matter and then watched the senior litigator compound that 
mistake by lying to a federal judge in an attempt to cover up the initial lie. 
The associate did not take any steps to correct the record and labored to 
make sense of what he was seeing—he “couldn’t believe it . . . [and] kept 
thinking there must be a reason.”219  
Consider also the possibility of pluralistic ignorance—mistakenly 
believing that others do not share one’s understanding or perception of the 
world.220 When one looks around the firm (or to other observers such as 
accountants or regulators) and does not see anyone else objecting to 
questionable behavior, one may conclude that nothing is amiss, judging 
others’ failure to object as evidence that the behavior is not improper. But 
those others may be silent because they too are attempting to assess the 
situation.221 
To make matters worse, the illusion of transparency—the tendency to 
overestimate our ability to accurately read others’ emotional states and their 
ability to read ours—can compound the difficulties that people have in 
assessing each other’s reactions.222 In one set of studies, for example, 
observers’ ratings of the extent to which people appeared outwardly 
concerned about another person’s unethical behavior were significantly 
lower than those same people’s self-rated levels of actual concern. That is, 
people were more concerned than they looked. But people also 
                                                                                                                            
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 15, 24 (2012). The study also found a similar, but smaller, effect 
with respect to vicarious honesty. Id. at 23. 
218. MILGRAM, supra note 61, at 119. 
219. Luban, supra note 204, at 95 (emphasis added). 
220. Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. Prentice, Collective Errors and Errors About the 
Collective, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 541, 541 (1994); Deborah A. Prentice & 
Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and the Perpetuation of Social Norms by Unwitting 
Actors, in 28 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 161 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1996). 
221. In a classic study, psychologists Bibb Latané and John Darley investigated what would 
happen when smoke started to drift into a room in which research participants were filling out 
questionnaires. When participants were alone, most (75%) reported the smoke. But, when more 
participants were in the room, far fewer reported the smoke. Latané & Darley, supra note 210, 
at 217–18. Looking to others for social cues often provides useful information—but not always. 
222. See Thomas Gilovich et al., The Illusion of Transparency: Biased Assessments of 
Others’ Ability to Read One’s Emotional States, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 332, 344 
(1998). 
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overestimated the degree to which they manifested their concern to others. 
Thus, individuals may believe that their own concern is apparent to others 
when it is not.223 
Finally, the presence of others can sometimes result in a diffusion of 
responsibility in which no one assumes responsibility for acting. 
A well-known example involves the failure of top 
Salomon Brothers officials to report or take prompt corrective 
action against a trader who submitted false auction bids to evade 
Treasury Department purchase limits. Four top executives knew of 
the misconduct and failed to act for several months: the CEO, the 
president, the general counsel, and the vice chairman, who was the 
trader’s supervisor. According to findings by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, each of these officials “placed 
responsibility for investigating [and curbing the trader’s] conduct . 
. . on someone else.” The result was a major financial crisis when 
the threat of a public investigation ultimately forced disclosure.
224
 
Similar diffusion of responsibility can occur, for example, when an 
associate assumes that someone else will make a decision about how to bill 
her hours.225 
G. Responding to Others’ Ethicality 
Lawyers often find themselves in the position of dealing with the 
ethicality of others—clients, colleagues, and opponents.226 Interestingly, we 
tend to be much more judgmental of the ethical failings of others than we 
are of our own, to see ourselves as being more ethical, objective, and fair 
than others,227 to doubt others’ reasons for engaging in cooperative acts, and 
to assume that other people are motivated by self-interest.228 We often have 
                                                                                                                            
223. Id. at 343 (studies 3a and 3b). 
224. Deborah L. Rhode, Introduction: Where is the Leadership in Moral Leadership?, in 
MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND POLICY 1, 27–28 
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006). 
225. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 215, at 716 (describing firm in which associates and 
paralegals were to keep complete billing records and partners would reduce if they thought the 
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226. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010) (“A lawyer who knows that another 
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, 
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227. See Gilovich et al, supra note 222. 
228. Epley & Caruso, supra note 52, at 172; see also Clayton R. Critcher & David 
Dunning, No Good Deed Goes Unquestioned: Cynical Reconstruals Maintain Belief in the 
Power of Self-Interest, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1207, 1212 (2011); Epley & 
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an interpersonal ethics blind spot in which others’ unethical behaviors are 
more noticeable than their ethical ones.229 Consistent with the actor-
observer bias, we attribute others’ moral failings to flaws in their 
dispositions, but attribute our own missteps to situational factors.230 We 
focus more on ethics when judging others, but find competence more 
important than integrity when judging ourselves.231 And we judge others 
based on faulty predictions about what we might have done under the same 
circumstances.232 
But while we can be relatively harsh judges of others’ ethics, our 
psychology can make it difficult to notice and respond to others’ unethical 
behavior.233 First, limits on our ability to pay attention can lead us to miss 
unethical behavior taking place right in front of us when we are focused on 
other things like our own cases and deadlines.234 Second, we have a 
tendency to identify with other people—colleagues or clients—whose 
interests are aligned with ours,235 making it harder to notice and objectively 
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Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 
80 (Edward E. Jones et al. eds., 1972). 
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Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional 
Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059, 1059 (1999). 
235. Don A. Moore et al., Conflict of Interest and the Intrusion of Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & 
DECISION MAKING 37, 45 (2010); Leigh Thompson, “They Saw a Negotiation”: Partisanship 
and Involvement, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 839, 850 (1995); see also Leigh 
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assess their ethics. Similarly, it can be difficult to acknowledge the 
unethical behavior of others when doing so would harm one’s own interests. 
This motivated blindness can cause our judgments to be biased in favor of 
our client or colleague and we are inclined to view their actions favorably, 
disinclined to believe that they have acted wrongly, and able to recruit 
reasons to support their actions.236 Third, we may let others off the hook 
because we are aware of other instances in which they have acted 
ethically—a form of moral licensing.237 Fourth, just as it can be difficult to 
identify the point at which one’s own behavior has gradually crossed the 
line, detection of when others’ incrementally degrading behavior becomes 
unethical can be challenging.238 Fifth, the fact that outcome bias may cause 
our evaluations of the quality of a decision to be influenced by how the 
decision turns out,239 can lead us to ignore others’ unethical decisions unless 
and until something bad happens.240 
Finally, people tend to think that they “will take socially risky actions, 
when they, in fact, do not”—the illusion of courage.241 In the abstract we 
might think we would have the courage to call out the unethical behavior of 
a client or colleague,242 but when actually deciding whether to do so the 
immediate negative consequences of confronting the other person—a 
difficult conversation, the loss of a client, the ire of a partner, the loss of a 
job, or the difficulty of procuring future employment—loom large. Consider 
also another key lesson from the Milgram obedience studies—that although 
                                                                                                                            
Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal 
Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 194 (1992). 
236. Moore et al., supra note 235, at 40; see Langevoort, supra note 33, at 104; see also 
Kimberly Kirkland, Self-Deception and the Pursuit of Ethical Practice: Challenges Faced by 
Large Law Firm General Counsel, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 593, 593–94 (2011) (describing the 
difficulty that large firm general counsel have in characterizing colleagues as unethical). 
237. See Daniel A. Effron & Benoît Monin, Letting People Off the Hook: When Do Good 
Deeds Excuse Transgressions?, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1618, 1631 (2010) 
(finding this to be the case when the unethical act is somewhat ambiguous and the prior ethical 
behavior is in the same domain). 
238. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 37, at 48 (discussing how auditors might gradually 
come to accept corporation’s unethical accounting practices). 
239. Baron & Hershey, supra note 83, at 578. 
240. Gino et al., supra note 84, at 93; see also, e.g., Robert Prentice, Contract-Based 
Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 23 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 404 
(2003) (noting that a supervisor may rate an employee’s bad conduct negatively upon learning 
of a poor outcome, but is less likely to do so if the outcome is unknown). 
241. DUNNING, supra note 232, at 148. 
242. Here, too, there is a blind spot: we tend to believe that we are more likely to call out 
bad behavior than are our peers (and that our reporting is more internally driven, while that of 
our peers is more driven by external rewards). Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives 
Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for 
Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1190 (2010). 
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most of the participants noticed that what they were being asked to do was 
problematic, and indeed, many clearly expressed reservations,243 they were 
nonetheless unable to turn their objections into a course of behavior that 
effectively resisted the direction to continue. As psychologists Lee Ross and 
Richard Nisbett have noted: “the Milgram experiments ultimately may have 
less to say about ‘destructive obedience’ than about ineffectual, and 
indecisive, disobedience.”244 For example, there were lawyers who raised 
questions about Enron’s dealings before its collapse. “In the end, [however,] 
the doubting lawyers never pressed the issues.”245 
In this vein, consider again the story of John Gellene and his false 
declarations about potential conflicts of interest in affidavits submitted to 
the court. At several points in the course of the representation, one of 
Gellene’s partners, Toni Lichstein, raised questions about the potential 
conflict of interest. Lichstein, however, was repeatedly told by Gellene and 
Lederman that “it was not a problem . . . [and] that Milbank had undertaken 
all of its disclosure obligations.”246 Although Lichstein questioned the 
conduct on several occasions, she was not able push the issue hard enough 
to convince the firm to take action. 
When faced with others’ potentially unethical conduct, attorneys may 
make decisions with an eye toward minimizing the regret that they 
anticipate feeling—worrying more about making a false accusation than 
about failing to intervene.247 Attorneys may overweight such anticipated 
losses as compared to the less certain and more abstract future 
consequences of remaining silent. Yet, the future consequences may turn 
out to be severe.248 
                                                                                                                            
243. MILGRAM, supra note 61, at 116. 
244. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 153, at 57 (emphasis added). 
245. Gordon, supra note 21, at 1193 (citing Mike France, What About the Lawyers?, BUS. 
WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58; Ellen Joan Pollock, Limited Partners: Lawyers for Enron Faulted Its 
Deals, Didn’t Force Issue, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at A1). 
246. REGAN, supra note 13, at 250. 
247. Mark D. Rogerson et al., Nonrational Processes in Ethical Decision Making, 66 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 614, 616 (2011). This is also another example of the omission bias. See Baron & 
Hershey, supra note 83, at 569. 
248. For example, some of those who heard about or witnessed Penn State coach Jerry 
Sandusky’s transgressions, but failed to report them, are themselves now being prosecuted. 
Mark Scolforo, Graham Spanier Charged: Ex-Penn State President Facing Perjury Charge in 
Jerry Sandusky Case, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 1, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/01/graham-spanier-charged-penn-state-
sandusky_n_2057723.html. 
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III. WHY DON’T WE RECOGNIZE AND LEARN FROM ETHICAL FAILURES? 
For many of the same reasons that we find it difficult to identify ethical 
challenges in the moment, we also find it difficult to see the ethical 
implications of our decisions after the fact. Indeed, in one study of lawyer 
discipline cases, most of the lawyers “were convinced that they had done 
nothing wrong.”249 And, in many notorious cases—such as the collapse of 
Enron—the lawyers involved maintain that they acted properly.250 Once we 
have engaged in unethical behavior, we feel the need to reconcile that 
behavior with our otherwise positive views of ourselves, to avoid the 
distressing feeling known as cognitive dissonance.251 Thus, we may engage 
in a post-hoc process of moral disengagement in which we re-characterize 
what happened so that questionable conduct becomes more permissible.252 
While many people think of ethical decision making as being the product of 
deliberative ethical reasoning, psychologists have found that ethical 
decision making tends to be based on relatively intuitive judgments, with 
moral reasoning occurring after the fact.253 Once we have made a choice, we 
are usually able to mobilize reasons to bolster that decision.254 
                                                                                                                            
249. ABEL, supra note 78, at 491. 
250. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 1190; see also The Financial Collapse of Enron—Part 
4: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Oversight and Investigations, 107th Cong. 19–22 (2002) 
(statement of Joseph C. Dilg, Managing Partner of Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg78506/html/CHRG-107hhrg78506.htm 
(expressing his confidence that the firm “fully met its ethical and professional responsibilities” 
in representing Enron). 
251. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 8 (1957); see also Shahar 
Ayal & Francesca Gino, Honest Rationales for Dishonest Behavior, in THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY: EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF GOOD AND EVIL 149, 150 (Mario 
Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2012) (describing ethical dissonance); Luban, supra note 
204, at 95. 
252. Bandura, supra note 67, at 194; Lisa L. Shu et al., Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: 
When Cheating Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting, 37 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 330, 331 (2011). 
253. Haidt, supra note 104, at 818. For a general discussion of intuitive and deliberative 
thinking, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
254. See, e.g., Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors 
Influence Judgments, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 122, 123 
(1996); Michael I. Norton, Joseph A. Vandello, & John M. Darley, Casuistry and Social 
Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 817 (2004); Samuel R. Sommers & 
Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race Neutral Justifications: Experimental 
Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
261, 264 (2007); see also Richard Nisbett & Timothy Wilson, Telling More Than We Can 
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 232 (1977). The analytic 
skills of lawyers seem well suited to this sort of thinking. Indeed, people engaging in this sort of 
rationalization are sometimes characterized as “intuitive lawyers.” See, e.g., Haidt, supra note 
104, at 821; Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing of 
Organizational Dilemmas: Decision Makers as Intuitive Lawyers, in CODES OF CONDUCT: 
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Given this general human tendency, it is unsurprising that lawyers who 
face ethical complaints or questions tend to recruit a range of 
justifications.255 Conduct that is inconsistent with one’s image of oneself as 
an ethical person can be attributed to situational, rather than dispositional, 
factors.256 Attempts may also be made to locate blame elsewhere—on 
adversaries,257 on the circumstances,258 on regulators,259 on clients,260 and on 
judges.261 The omission bias described above can be invoked to minimize 
blame of one who did not engage in an affirmative act.262 Unethical conduct 
can also be rationalized post-hoc through appeals to different metrics of 
                                                                                                                            
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 59 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel 
eds., 1996). 
255. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 78, at 100. 
256. See Jones & Harris, supra note 140; see also Austin Sarat, Enactments of 
Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 828 (1998) (reporting that each group of attorneys “presents itself as 
a ‘victim’ of forces over which it has little or no control”). 
257. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 256, at 822 (reporting attorney’s view that “[r]efusal to 
answer (a discovery request) is not an ethical problem because plaintiffs’ counsel can remedy it 
(through motions to compel)”); see also Yablon, supra note 171, at 1624 n.18 (“Lawyers tend to 
blame discovery abuse on the fact that their opponents act like jerks . . . .”); Michael Powell & 
Lois Romano, Roman Catholic Church Shifts Legal Strategy: Aggressive Litigation Replaces 
Quiet Settlements, WASH. POST, May 13, 2002, at Al (reporting that lawyers for the church “said 
some plaintiffs are delusional, while others blame every problem in their life on past abuse by 
priests”). 
258. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 78, at 33, 65, 100 (noting that lawyers blame circumstances 
such as workload, judicial backlog); Lerman, supra note 215, at 713–14 (describing lawyers 
who justified unethical billing practices by pointing to the “unreasonable” billing requirements 
of their firms). 
259. Langevoort, supra note 66; see also ABEL, supra note 78, at 32 (noting disciplined 
lawyers’ objections to “selective prosecution”); REGAN, supra note 13, at 328 (“Lawyers in 
large firms . . . tend to be skeptical that strict application of the bankruptcy conflict rule serves 
important ethical purposes.”). 
260. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 78, at 65 (describing a lawyer who “blamed his personal 
injury clients for his own failure to pursue their claims”), at 101 (describing lawyer who 
deceived client because “it would have been very hard for him to understand” and failed to tell 
another her case had been dismissed (due to his negligence) because “she never asked me 
specifically”). Billing disputes are often blamed on clients, with attorneys arguing that clients 
received regular billing statements and should have raised any questions at earlier stages, that 
big clients can afford to pay more, that aggressively billing big clients allows them to represent 
other clients who cannot afford them, and that they only billed what they were worth. See, e.g., 
ABEL, supra note 78, at 350–51; Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and 
Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 258–62 (1999); cf. Lisa G. Lerman, 
Scenes From A Law Firm, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2153, 2187–88 (1998). 
261. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 256, at 832 (reporting lawyers’ consensus “that judges hate 
to get involved in discovery disputes . . . leaving it to the lawyers to play the discovery game 
with relatively little supervision”). 
262. For example, an attorney might tell herself or others that she would have disclosed 
particular information if the other side had specifically asked about it. 
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fairness or to other accepted values—for example, notions of lawyers as 
zealous advocates or creative interpreters of legal rules, rules protecting 
client confidences, principles of reciprocity or self-defense, or the need to 
fight against injustice. 
Confirmation bias also helps us remember aspects of the decision or 
situation that are consistent with an ethical self-image, rather than the 
details of any ethical lapse. “If mistakes were made, memory helps us 
remember that they were made by someone else. If we were there, we were 
just innocent bystanders.”263 Such memory effects can result in what ethicist 
Patricia Werhane has called moral amnesia or “an inability to remember or 
learn from one’s own and other’s past mistakes and to transfer that 
knowledge when fresh challenges arise.”264 
All of this can conspire with the pressure to act in ways that are 
consistent with our own prior behavior,265 making it difficult to learn from 
or acknowledge any missteps. Consider again John Gellene, the bankruptcy 
attorney described in Eat What You Kill. Why didn’t he, at some point, 
recognize his mistake and correct his misstatements to the court? 
It likely would have been psychologically stressful for Gellene to 
do so at this point, however. He had made a prior decision not to 
disclose the Salovaara and South Street connections. He had 
publicly proclaimed Milbank’s fitness for the job in the face of an 
attack. He likely had rationalized his conduct in a way that 
permitted him to deny that he had done anything unethical. It 
would be hard at this point to disavow those representations and to 
reassess that rationalization.
266
 
                                                                                                                            
263. CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY 
WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 70 (2007). 
264. PATRICIA H. WERHANE, MORAL IMAGINATION AND THE SEARCH FOR ETHICAL 
DECISION-MAKING IN MANAGEMENT 7 (1999). As a result of this sort of self-deception, people 
can fail to discount their accomplishments for the fact that such successes were gained through 
unethical means. This can make learning particularly difficult. See Zoë Chance et al., Temporal 
View of the Costs and Benefits of Self-Deception, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15655, 15656 
(2011) (finding that participants who obtained high scores by cheating predicted that they would 
score well on a subsequent test on which they could not cheat). 
265. CIALDINI, supra note 64, at 57. 
266. REGAN, supra note 13, at 343; see also Langevoort, supra note 66, at 512 (“To blow 
the whistle now on any common practice or pattern of innovation would raise troubling 
questions about the prior months or years when the lawyer acquiesced in what was happening. 
The mind fights such inference.”). 
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Finally, engaging in unethical behavior can itself change one’s 
perspective on and memory of the relevant ethical standards.267 When our 
behavior and our beliefs conflict, one way to reduce the resulting 
discomfort is to change our beliefs to match our behavior. For example, 
those who cheat tend to become more lenient in their judgments of cheating, 
and those who resist cheating become more intolerant of cheating.268 Also, 
the effects of pluralistic ignorance can mean that as no one speaks up about 
particular unethical behavior, new norms of ethics begin to emerge that alter 
attitudes about ethics. 
IV. WHAT CAN WE DO? 
The common prescriptions for ethical failures are to increase the severity 
and enforcement of applicable sanctions and to pay greater attention to 
educating attorneys about the relevant ethical rules.269 But while some 
ethical failures are the result of deliberate moral reasoning and cost-benefit 
analysis that lead to an unethical decision and some ethical failures are due 
to a lack of knowledge of the relevant rules, a range of evidence suggests 
that many ethical failures occur unconsciously and unintentionally, even 
where the attorney has basic knowledge of the relevant ethical rules. Thus, 
individual attorneys and legal employers270 should take steps that go beyond 
these common responses, steps that focus on dealing with ambiguities in 
rules and standards,271 ethical issues arising out of the agency relationship, 
the challenges of the adversarial system, the tolls of law practice, the 
influence of status and power, issues relating to lawyers’ practice in groups, 
                                                                                                                            
267. Shu et al., supra note 252, at 332; Lisa Shu & Francesca Gino, Sweeping Dishonesty 
Under the Rug: How Unethical Actions Lead to Forgetting of Moral Rules, 102 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1164, 1168 (2012). 
268. See, e.g., Judson Mills, Changes in Moral Attitudes Following Temptation, 26 J. 
PERSONALITY 517, 518 (1958). See generally Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive 
Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 203–04 (1959). 
Even considering the behavior from the perspective of the person who has acted unethically can 
affect judgments of ethicality. Shirit Kronzon & John Darley, Is This Tactic Ethical? Biased 
Judgments of Ethics in Negotiation, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 58 (1999). 
269. See, e.g., Monroe Freedman, Foreward, Ethics, Truth, and Justice in Criminal 
Litigation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1371, 1375 (2000). 
270. The psychology of ethical decision making and behavior that we review here also has 
important implications for how we teach about ethics in law schools. For one recent discussion 
on this subject see Art Hinshaw, Teaching Negotiation Ethics, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 82 (2013). 
271. We do not, in this Article, offer suggestions as to how ethical rules might be changed 
to better accommodate human psychology. While improvement in the content of the rules is 
likely possible and desirable, our focus here is on improvements that can be made in the context 
of the existing ethical rules. 
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and the difficulties lawyers face in responding to instances in which others 
fail to act ethically. 
A. Improving Individual Ethics 
For all the reasons discussed, even attorneys who begin their careers with 
the purest of motives and the highest of ethical aspirations are at risk for 
committing ethical infractions. Yet, attorneys can take affirmative steps to 
minimize the likelihood that they will behave unethically and to create the 
capacity for ethical courage.272 
1. Be Aware of the Psychology of Ethics 
It is important for lawyers to recognize their susceptibility to bounded 
ethicality and to have an awareness of the factors that can influence ethical 
decision making. While many of the phenomena we discuss operate outside 
of conscious awareness, recognizing their existence makes it possible to 
take steps to address them.273 Attorneys can better plan for how to handle 
ethical dilemmas if they understand that their predictions about how they 
will react to future ethical issues are not always accurate. Attorneys who 
understand that unethical decisions are more likely when losses loom can 
exercise particular caution in those circumstances—such as when they are at 
risk of losing an important client. Attorneys who understand the nature of 
the slippery ethics slope can seek to resist the pull of each step. Attorneys 
who understand that even (or especially) their core values can lead them 
astray, can be alert for such vulnerability. Attorneys who understand the 
dynamics of social norms and pluralistic ignorance will be equipped to 
                                                                                                                            
272. See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COURAGE: MODERN RESEARCH ON AN ANCIENT 
VIRTUE (Cynthia L.S. Pury & Shane J. Lopez, eds., 2010); see also ZIMBARDO, supra note 210, 
at 21–22, 485 (discussing the “banality of heroism” and noting that just as each of us is capable 
of unethical behavior, so too are we each a “potential hero, waiting for the right situational 
moment to make the decision to . . . [do the right thing] despite personal risk and sacrifice”);  
Psychology & Heroism: Defining Heroism, HEROIC IMAGINATION PROJECT, 
http://www.heroicimagination.org/welcome/psychology-and-heroism (last visited Sept. 8, 
2013). 
273. See NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—
BUT SOME DON’T 366 (2012) (quoting Daniel Kahneman: “‘There’s no way that you can control 
yourself not to have [the Müller-Lyer] illusion,’ Kahneman told me. ‘You look at [the arrows], 
and one of the arrows is going to look longer than the other. But you can train yourself to 
recognize that this is a pattern that causes an illusion, and in that situation, I can’t trust my 
impressions; I’ve got to use a ruler.’”). 
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reject the assumption that no one else is bothered.274 Attorneys who 
recognize the temptation of post-hoc rationalization can question the 
reasons they generate for their own behavior.275 Attorneys who know that 
disclosure distortion may lead them to act more unethically in a situation in 
which interests conflict can take steps to guard against that result. And, 
attorneys who are aware that the agency relationship may tempt them to 
overstep can watch how far they go to try to help their client.276 
2. Make Ethics Salient 
“[I]f we are reminded of morality at the moment we are tempted, then we 
are much more likely to be honest.”277 Thus, it can be important for 
attorneys to find ways to include ethical factors in the mix of considerations 
reviewed in making a given decision,278 even when the decision does not 
obviously turn on ethical considerations. 
Bringing ethical considerations to the forefront can also help us 
encourage others to behave ethically. For example, negotiators are less 
likely to engage in deception when they have recently been reminded of 
ethical norms.279 Similarly, negotiators who give reasons for their offers or 
demands that are in step with fairness norms are more likely to elicit ethical 
behavior from the other side.280 
To bring ethics to the fore, individual attorneys can: 
                                                                                                                            
274. For example, the Enron whistleblower, Sherron Watkins, spoke out even though others 
at Enron acted as if all were well. Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, 
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1373, 1379–81 (2003). 
275. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67, at 234.  
276. See generally Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring 
Behavior: The Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 565 (2007) (finding that educating people about the limits of introspection 
reduced the bias blind spot). 
277. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS 289 (2008); see also Mazar et al., supra note 36, at 635 (hypothesizing that “when 
people attend to their own moral standards . . . any dishonest action is more likely to be 
reflected in their self-concept . . . which in turn will cause them to adhere to a stricter 
delineation of honest and dishonest behavior”). 
278. Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 20 (suggesting that organizations can reduce 
unethical behavior by “making behavioral norms . . . more prominent and clearly defined”); see 
also David F. Caldwell & Dennis Moberg, An Exploratory Investigation of the Effect of Ethical 
Culture in Activating Moral Imagination, 73 J. BUS. ETHICS 193, 201 (2007). 
279. See, e.g., Karl Aquino, The Effects of Ethical Climate and the Availability of 
Alternatives on the Use of Deception During Negotiation, 9 INT’L  J. CONFLICT MGMT. 195, 200 
(1998). 
280. See Maurice E. Schweitzer & Donald E. Gibson, Fairness, Feelings, and Ethical 
Decision-Making: Consequences of Violating Community Standards of Fairness, 77 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 287, 287 (2008). 
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 Reflect regularly on core values. Keeping a journal or engaging in 
other forms of self-reflection can help keep ethics on the table and 
can facilitate detection of moments in which decisions challenge 
those values.281 
 Keep a reminder of core values front and center. A paperweight, 
wall hanging, or other memento can be a visual reminder of the 
standards one wants to uphold.282 
 Avoid euphemisms.283 
 Imagine and individualize the people on the other side or the people 
who will experience the consequences of a decision.284 
 Bear in mind the long-term reputational consequences—to the 
individual lawyer and the organization—of unethical conduct.285 
3. Be Self-Critical 
It can be helpful for individual lawyers to develop a critical stance 
toward their own ethics. Given how easy it can be for attorneys to justify a 
desired course of action or fall into telling clients, colleagues, or supervising 
attorneys what they want to hear, attorneys should ask themselves whether 
their advice or ethical decisions would be the same if they were on the other 
side of the decision. Questioning one’s judgments, considering the 
                                                                                                                            
281. See, e.g., Crowley & Gottlieb, supra note 102, at 68 (recommending self-reflection 
activities to help practitioners consider the origin of their personal morals and how they align 
with the ethics code). Law professor Kate Kruse, who has her students write letters to 
themselves discussing their core values and ambitions and then returns the letters (unopened) to 
students when they graduate, reports that students have found the letter helps keep them on their 
intended path. Professor Jennifer Brown has commenced a journaling project with her students, 
designed to help them think about their internal values and recall their early goals and values 
once they become attorneys. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Beginner’s Wisdom: A Guided Journal 
for Reflecting Upon the Professional and Personal Lessons of the 1L Year (unpublished work in 
progress) (on file with author); see also Alison L. Antes et al., Applying Cases to Solve Ethical 
Problems: The Significance of Positive and Process-Oriented Reflection, 22 ETHICS & BEHAV. 
113, 115, 123 (2012); Hugo J.E.M. Alberts et al., Fighting Self-Control Failure: Overcoming 
Ego Depletion by Increasing Self-Awareness, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 58, 58 
(2011) (finding that self-awareness increases self-control). 
282. See ARIELY, supra note 277. 
283. See supra notes 77–78. 
284. See supra notes 83–85; see also Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 20 (suggesting 
that organizations can reduce unethical behavior by teaching employees to “learn to associate 
potential unethical behavior with severe, well-defined harm . . . to a familiar or recognizable 
victim similar to the actor”). 
285. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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opposite,286 and examining “the justifications that we concoct to rationalize 
our actions” with a critical eye can help to temper the fading of ethics from 
decision making.287 
Similarly, seeking or adopting an outside perspective—ideally before 
one takes the first step, but also when one finds oneself elsewhere on the 
slope—can lead to a more nuanced consideration of a decision’s potential 
ethical implications.288 Consulting past experience can help one more 
realistically assess whether a contemplated workload is manageable or 
whether another case can be competently handled.289 Considering how a 
“disinterested” or “disagreeable” observer might evaluate the situation, 
decision, or conduct, can provide a valuable perspective.290 Consulting 
ethics counsel291 or calling an ethics hotline292 may contribute to this critical 
analysis. Attorneys may also find it helpful to consider how a trusted friend 
or family member might view a particular action—asking themselves, for 
example, whether they could look a parent in the eyes and explain a 
particular choice.293 Similarly, one might be careful not to do anything one 
would not feel comfortable having made public.294 
                                                                                                                            
286. Charles G. Lord, et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social 
Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1231 (1984); see also Laura J. Kray & 
Adam D. Galinsky, The Debiasing Effect of Counterfactual Mind-sets: Increasing the Search 
for Disconfirmatory Information in Group Decisions, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 69, 76 (2003). 
287. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67, at 234. 
288. Rhode, supra note 126, at 1320–21; Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 67, at 231 
(recognizing also that the best one may be able to do is to “try to imagine what the other would 
experience from our own perspective”). 
289. See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A 
Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 24–25 (1993) (discussing the “outside 
view” as one that takes into account past cases that are similar to the present one). 
290. See Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and 
Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 296 (2006) (discussing the “disagreeable 
adjudicator”); Lord et al., supra note 286, at 1231–32 (finding that considering an “opposite” 
perspective is effective in reducing biased evaluation). Prior to 2002, the commentary to Rule 
1.7 advised that lawyers consider the perspective of a “disinterested lawyer” in evaluating 
conflicts of interest, but that language was removed as part of the Ethics 2000 revisions to the 
rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 5 (2001). 
291. See Kimberly Kirkland, Ethical Infrastructures and De Facto Ethical Norms at Work 
in Large US Law Firms: The Role of Ethics Counsel, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 181, 199 (2008) 
(evaluating the role of ethics counsel). 
292. See, e.g., Ethics Hotline, ST. B. OF CAL., http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Ethics/Hotline.aspx 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2013). 
293. In describing decisions to act ethically, many people evoke the notion that they want to 
be able to “look at themselves in the mirror.” This idea has been attributed to a German 
ambassador who purportedly resigned rather than provide prostitutes to a royal party, stating “I 
refused to see a pimp in the mirror in the morning when I shave.” HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., 
GOOD WORK: WHEN EXCELLENCE AND ETHICS MEET 11 (2001). Consistent with this instinct, 
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As part of this critical stance, a focus on attentively striving to behave 
ethically is key. Valuing ethics as part of one’s identity helps to sustain 
ethical behavior when time and cognitive resources are in short supply. That 
is, one who puts great stock in having a positive moral identity is better 
equipped to resist the pull towards unethical conduct.295 Attorneys might 
prime the importance of ethics to their identity by attending conferences or 
participating in other groups focused on professional responsibility296 as 
well as through the other ways in which they choose to make ethics salient. 
At the same time, it is also very important to be humble about one’s 
likely success in this endeavor. Given the tendency to be overconfident 
about our own ethics,297 attorneys should resist the “reassuring illusion of 
invulnerability”—the misapprehension that they will always be able to 
identify and resist the influences that shape behavior.298 In particular, all 
else being equal, people who are primed to think of themselves as highly 
ethical are more likely to act unethically (as a result of moral licensing) than 
are those who focus on their own past unethical deeds.299 It is better, then, to 
admit and remember mistakes, rather than to overestimate one’s virtue.300 
Overall then, striving for ethical success but recognizing one’s ethical 
fallibility may be the best path toward ethical behavior. 
                                                                                                                            
increasing awareness of one’s self and values—for example, looking at one’s image in a 
mirror—reduces the incidence of unprincipled behavior. See, e.g., Arthur L. Beaman et al., Self-
Awareness and Transgression in Children: Two Field Studies, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1835, 1842 (1979); Edward Diener & Mark Wallbom, Effects of Self-Awareness on 
Antinormative Behavior, 10 J. RES. PERSONALITY 107, 107 (1976); Carl A. Kallgren et al., A 
Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: When Norms Do and Do Not Affect Behavior, 26 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1002, 1008–10 (2000); Lynne C. Vincent et al., 
Stretching the Moral Gray Zone: Positive Affect, Moral Disengagement, and Dishonesty, 24 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 595, 598 (2013). 
294. See Leslie C. Levin, Immigration Lawyers and the Lying Client, in LAWYERS IN 
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 101–03. 
295. Francesca Gino et al., Unable to Resist Temptation: How Self-Control Depletion 
Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROC. 191, 199 
(2011); Barry R. Schlenker et al., Moral Identity, Integrity, and Personal Responsibility, in 
PERSONALITY, IDENTITY, AND CHARACTER: EXPLORATIONS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 
31., at 316; see also Gert Cornelissen et al., Rules or Consequences? The Role of Ethical Mind-
Sets in Moral Dynamics, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 482, 487 (2013). 
296. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 1, 13 (2009) (suggesting that people often identify with groups and adopt a set of 
standards that guide behavior). 
297. See supra Section I.A. 
298. ZIMBARDO, supra note 210, at 180. 
299. Jennifer Jordan et al., Striving for the Moral Self: The Effects of Recalling Past Moral 
Actions on Future Moral Behavior, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 701, 702 (2011); 
see also ZIMBARDO, supra note 210; Sonya Sachdeva et al., Sinning Saints and Saintly Sinners: 
The Paradox of Moral Self-Regulation, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 523, 524 (2009). 
300. Jordan et al., supra note 299. 
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4. Plan Ahead 
Critical thought takes time and cognitive resources, and as previously 
discussed, a lack of time and the presence of cognitive stressors can lead to 
unethical decision making. But attorneys can enhance their ethical behavior 
by planning ahead and cultivating a set of ethical habits, so that making the 
right call becomes more automatic.301 
Because it can be quite difficult to predict how we will handle ethical 
challenges, we should try to anticipate ethical dilemmas and to specifically 
plan and rehearse our responses ahead of time—creating scripts for 
ourselves that we can follow when necessary.302 Engaging in an ethical 
planning process allows us to step away from the relevant pressures and 
focus instead on how to rise to one’s ethical ideals.303 Similarly, exploring 
one’s “ethics autobiography”—reflecting on personal values, professional 
responsibilities, and how they relate, can help establish ethical intuitions 
and increase awareness of one’s ethical weaknesses.304 Identifying the 
resources that might be available—for example, in-house ethics counsel, an 
ethics hotline, or a trusted confidant—can mean that these resources will 
more likely spring to mind when needed. Anticipating the pressures that are 
likely to be dominant at the time of the decision can minimize mis-
prediction.305 And, establishing implementation intentions—anticipating 
concrete triggers and planning specific responses—can help one to act 
consistently with one’s ideals.306 Imagining and practicing, for example, the 
                                                                                                                            
301. See Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the 
Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 197 (2004). In particular, some of 
the effects we have described here—such as the impact of loss frames on ethical decision 
making—can be moderated when there is less time pressure. Mary C. Kern & Dolly Chugh, 
Bounded Ethicality: The Perils of Loss Framing, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 378, 378 (2009). Because 
busy attorneys will not always have time for extended analysis, it is important to take time to 
make thoughtful decisions when that is possible and to plan ahead for when it is not. 
302. Ann E. Tenbrunsel et al., The Ethical Mirage: A Temporal Explanation as to Why We 
Aren’t as Ethical as We Think We Are 37 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 08-012, 2009); 
see also Trope & Liberman, supra note 59, at 404. 
303. Kivetz & Tyler, supra note 59, at 208. 
304. Crowley & Gottlieb, supra note 102, at 68 (“[I]ncreased insight may enable 
practitioners to recognize how good intentions can be assets and liabilities and help them detect 
the direction of this influence in complex ethical situations.”). 
305. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO 
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 154 (2011) (citing Kristina A. Diekmann et al., An 
Examination of the Relationship Between Behavioral Forecasts and Interpersonal 
Condemnation in Two Organizational Conflict Situations (Univ. of Utah, Working Paper, 
2010)). 
306. See Peter M. Gollwitzer & Paschal Sheeran, Implementation Intentions and Goal 
Achievement: A Meta-Analysis of Effects of Processes, 38 ADV. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
69, 69 (2006). 
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specifics of how one will respond when a negotiation counterpart or 
discovery request asks for information one would rather not disclose, how 
one will respond when one is asked to do something with which one is 
uncomfortable, how one will deal with pressures to bill inappropriately, 
how one will proceed when one suspects that a client has not been candid or 
when a client asks the attorney to lie, or how one will act when one 
observes a colleague behaving unethically, can make it much easier to 
follow through with those plans.307 
To reduce the possibility of unwittingly sliding into problematic 
behavior, it can be helpful to identify concrete behaviors that can serve as 
warnings that a line may be crossed. 
Set yourself some telltale sign—something that you know is 
wrong. Write down on a piece of paper: “I will never backdate a 
document.” Or “I will never let a co-worker get blamed for 
something that was my fault.” Or “I will never paper a deal that I 
don’t understand.” Or “I will never do anything that I couldn’t 
describe to my dad while looking him in the eye.” Pick your 
telltale sign carefully—and, the moment the alarm rings, evacuate 
the building.
308
 
One immigration lawyer “recalled that his mentor in his first job taught 
him ‘that the minute that fraud comes up, you show people the door.’”309 
Similarly, it can be helpful to identify warning signs of less egregious 
missteps. 
Because we feel inclined to act in ways that are consistent with our 
previous actions, making a commitment to an ethical course of conduct—
particularly an active or public commitment—can help us stay the course. 
                                                                                                                            
307. See G. Richard Shell, Bargaining with the Devil Without Losing Your Soul, in WHAT’S 
FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 57, 71–73 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 
2004) (discussing ways to respond to questions without lying). In similar ways, crafting a 
strategy in advance for how one might disobey authority might channel disobedience. Lee Ross 
and Richard Nisbett propose the following “thought experiment”: 
Suppose that the experimenter had announced at the beginning of the session 
that, if at any time the teacher wished to terminate his participation in the 
experiment, he could indicate his desire to do so by pressing a button on the 
table in front of him. We trust the reader agrees with us that if this channel 
factor had been opened up, the obedience rate would have been a fraction of 
what it was. The converse of this is that the absence of such a ‘disobedience 
channel’ is precisely what condemned Milgram’s subjects to their hapless 
behavior. 
ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 153, at 57. 
308. Luban, supra note 171, at 369. 
309. Levin, supra note 294, at 102. 
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Thus, one might “precommit to [an] intended ethical choice by sharing it 
with an unbiased individual whose opinion you respect and whom you 
believe to be highly ethical”310 or one might write down a set of ethical 
commitments.311 
Finally, planning ahead can sometimes help one to eliminate potential 
problems—such as conflicts of interest. For example, one might avoid a 
certain type of fee agreement in a particular case. Or, one can decline to 
provide counsel when one’s judgment might be compromised. “No ethically 
sensitive (or even reasonably prudent) attorney should follow the example 
of Vinson & Elkins, which agreed to review the propriety of Enron 
transactions in which its own services had been used.”312 Similarly, if one 
believes an organization does not operate ethically, one may choose not to 
work there.313 
5. Recognize and Confront Others’ Unethical Conduct 
Many of these same strategies can help attorneys notice and respond to 
potential ethical missteps by clients, colleagues, or supervisors. But, we 
have seen that it can be quite difficult to recognize others’ unethical conduct 
and that group settings often make it even harder to recognize unethical 
conduct, due to the pressures of phenomena such as social conformity, 
pluralistic ignorance, and the illusion of transparency.314 To fight against 
these phenomena, attorneys should make ethics salient, exercise critical 
thought, and remind themselves that others’ silence is not necessarily an 
endorsement of particular behavior. 
Of course, even once attorneys have recognized questionable ethical 
actions involving clients, colleagues, or supervisors, it can also be 
particularly difficult to critique or challenge that behavior. Instead, it is 
tempting to withhold criticism from clients, colleagues, and supervisors, 
particularly in a workplace where collegiality is valued. But, attorneys 
should remind themselves that taking a critical stance better serves the 
client or colleague than does letting them blithely slide down a slippery 
ethical slope. Moreover, raising ethical concerns need not result in nasty 
confrontations. Instead, it is possible that the “[c]onduct that attorneys find 
                                                                                                                            
310. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 305, at 156. Thus, one might plan, with 
colleagues, law school classmates, or others, how one will respond to specific ethical 
challenges. 
311. See Crowley & Gottlieb, supra note 102, at 68 (discussing the benefits of journaling). 
312. Rhode, supra note 126, at 1334. 
313. See MATHER ET AL., supra note 212, at 124–27. 
314. See supra Section II.F. 
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ethically objectionable can be more diplomatically packaged as unduly 
risky, as something that will not play well with jurors, government 
regulators, the media, or the general public. By the same token, the moral 
high road can also be portrayed as desirable for prudential reasons,” 
important to the reputation of the client, lawyer, organization or profession, 
or as a means of forestalling regulation.315 Admittedly, such 
characterizations are not always possible or sufficient, and in some 
instances attorneys will have to be more blunt—serving the client, 
organization, or colleague by providing a reality check. In extreme 
circumstances, the attorney may even be required to withdraw from a 
representation or report a client or colleague’s improper act.316 Again, 
planning ahead can facilitate doing the right thing in these difficult 
circumstances. 
B. Enhance Organizational Ethical Culture 
Legal organizations cannot assume that law schools have taught junior 
attorneys everything they need to know about legal ethics, nor about 
reporting any problems they may find.317 “To assume that any 20-year-old 
of good general character can function ethically in professional situations is 
no more warranted than assuming that any logical 20-year-old can function 
as a lawyer without special education.”318 Similarly, legal organizations 
cannot assume that more senior lawyers know all that is necessary to 
prevent unethical behavior. Indeed, their very seniority and experience can 
contribute to the fading of ethics. Thus, organizations need to help all 
lawyers engage with ethics on an on-going basis. 
The ethical culture of a firm, company, agency, or practice group is an 
important determinant of how ethically the attorneys within that entity will 
behave.319 Importantly, the ethical culture of an organization depends not 
                                                                                                                            
315. Rhode, supra note 126, at 1318–19. 
316. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010). 
317. For example, Harvard grads “almost uniformly felt that their ethics training in law 
school had done little to prepare them for the issues they now confront as practicing attorneys.” 
Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to be a Human Being and a Lawyer”: Young 
Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 
495, 508 (2003). 
318. LINDA K. TREVIÑO & KATHERINE A. NELSON, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS: STRAIGHT 
TALK ABOUT HOW TO DO IT RIGHT 15–16 (2007) (quoting James Rest, Moral Judgment: An 
Interesting Variable for Higher Education Research, paper presented at the Annual Convention 
for the Association for the Study of Higher Education (1987)). 
319. See, e.g., Caldwell & Moberg, supra note 278, at 199–202; Muel Kaptein, Developing 
and Testing a Measure for the Ethical Culture of Organizations: The Corporate Ethical Virtues 
Model, 29 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 923, 923 (2008) (discussing characteristics of ethical 
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only on its expressed ethical codes and policies but also far more broadly on 
its systems and practices.320 Just as group norms may have a negative 
impact, so too may group norms set the stage for attorneys to do the right 
thing.321 Lawyers who observe others within the organization engaging in 
ethical behavior (particularly those seen as experts322 and those with whom 
they work closely)323 and who observe that the organization rewards ethical 
                                                                                                                            
climate: clarity of expectations, congruent signals, sufficient time/resources/systems, 
transparency, discussability, sanctionability); Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 21; James C. 
Wimbush & Jon M. Shepard, Toward An Understanding of Ethical Climate: Its Relationship to 
Ethical Behavior and Supervisory Influence, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 637, 638 (1994) (defining ethical 
climate as a set of “stable, psychologically meaningful, shared perceptions employees hold 
concerning ethical procedures and policies existing in their organizations”); see also Milton C. 
Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 942 (2007) 
(stating that culture “helps establish what is considered legitimate or unacceptable in an 
organization”). See generally MATHER ET AL., supra note 212; EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE 
COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON: THE SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION AMONG PEERS IN A 
CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP 255 (2001). 
320. In fact, research on the effects of codes of conduct alone has yielded mixed results. A 
recent meta-analysis concluded that the “existence of a code of conduct had a trivial connection 
with unethical choice.” Gary S. Weaver & Linda K. Treviño, Compliance and Values Oriented 
Ethics Programs: Influence on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315, 316–
18 (1999) (finding, however,  a “strong negative link . . . between code enforcement and 
unethical choice”). Other research has found that having a code of conduct or other set of ethical 
strictures at the forefront of one’s mind when making a decision can lead to more ethical 
decision making. See, e.g., Mazar et al., supra note 36, at 635 (suggesting that dishonesty 
increases as attention to standards for honesty decreases); see also Robert C. Ford & Woodrow 
D. Richardson, Ethical Decision Making: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 13 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 205, 216 (1994) (reviewing studies); Terry W. Loe et al., A Review of Empirical Studies 
Assessing Ethical Decision Making in Business, 25 J. BUS. ETHICS 185, 194 (2000) (reviewing 
studies); O’Fallon & Butterfield, supra note 210, at 117–31 (reviewing studies). For exploration 
of the meaning of organizational culture generally, see Susan S. Silbey, Legal Culture and 
Cultures of Legality, in SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE: A HANDBOOK 470 (John R. Hall et al. eds., 
2010). 
321. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 17, at 316 (finding attorney ethics to be influenced more 
by communities of practice than by the rules); Linda K. Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and 
Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 131 (1999) (“A 
firm’s approach to ethics and legal compliance management has an enormous impact on 
employees’ attitudes and behaviors.”). For a discussion of the influence of norms found in 
communities of practice, see Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, 
Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 809–13 (2000). 
322. See generally CARL I. HOVLAND ET AL., COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE (1953); Carl I. Hovland & Walter Weiss, The 
Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness, 15 PUB. OPINION Q. 635, 647 
(1952). 
323. Gary R. Weaver et al., “Somebody I Look Up To:” Ethical Role Models in 
Organizations, 34 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 313, 316–17 (2005); see also David M. Mayer 
et al., How Low Does Ethical Leadership Flow? Test of a Trickle-Down Model, 108 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 8 (2009) (finding that ethical 
leadership at higher levels influences employee behavior through its effect on mid-level 
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behavior are likely to make more ethical decisions themselves. Consider 
how two different prosecutors describe the culture within their offices and 
the messages those cultures send about ethics. The first culture emphasizes 
winning: 
“The trial atmosphere is that you’re there to win and have 
to win. That was really pushed, not a spoken rule but there was 
that pressure. You got it from the supervisor, his boss and those 
around you. It’s celebrated when you win.” In other words, 
regardless of what the chief prosecutor says to the public or within 
the office about the importance of procedural fairness, prosecutors 
get the message that winning at trial is the key to career success 
and that fair-process values are comparatively unimportant.
324
 
In contrast, consider how another prosecutor describes the tone set by the 
district attorney in his office: 
As prosecutors we’re not just out to win but to see that justice is 
done. We follow the principle that full disclosure is better in order 
to protect the process and the people subject to the process. Our 
office provides full disclosure and by adhering to the idea that we 
want to see justice done we protect the process and avoid wrongful 
convictions.
325
 
Different ethical climates can push behavior in different directions. But, 
while it is important to promote ethical behavior, it is also important to 
promote ethical behavior for the right reasons. It turns out that instrumental 
ethical climates grounded in not getting caught, self-interest, or individual 
advancement tend to be associated with a greater likelihood of unethical 
behavior as compared to ethical climates based on benevolence or concern 
for clients, colleagues, or social  justice.326 Thus, whereas a culture of “eat 
what you kill” might be a fertile breeding ground for unethical behavior, 
climates based on principles or rules and standards tend to be associated 
with more ethical behavior.327 
                                                                                                                            
supervisors). See generally Melissa S. Anderson et al., What Do Mentoring and Training in the 
Responsible Conduct of Research Have To Do with Scientists’ Misbehavior? Findings From a 
National Survey of NIH-Funded Scientists, 82 ACAD. MED. 853 (2007). 
324. Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences on 
Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, 
supra note 101, at 286–87. 
325. Id. at 282. 
326. Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 12–13. 
327. Id. at 3, 6; see also Weaver & Treviño, supra note 320 (comparing values-based and 
compliance-based ethics programs). See generally Bart Victor & John V. Cullen, The 
Organizational Bases of Ethical Work Climates, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 101 (1988).  
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1. Discuss and Model Ethical Behavior 
Whether at trainings, lunches, or by the water cooler, open discussion of 
ethics offers attorneys opportunities to grapple with thorny ethical issues, 
primes attorneys to more automatically consider ethics in their own decision 
making, creates an atmosphere that encourages attorneys to seek guidance 
from others when they encounter ethical dilemmas, and helps demonstrate 
to employees that ethics matter. Openly discussing ethics in organizations is 
associated with more ethical conduct328 and tends to have positive effects on 
“employee commitment, the perception that it’s acceptable to deliver bad 
news, the belief that employees would report an ethics violation, and [the 
belief] that decision making is better because of the ethics/compliance 
program.”329 
The stories that get told around the office send messages about what is 
valued. These messages can either reinforce or undermine the more formal 
ethics policies of the organization. 
[I]n one [prosecutor’s] office with an open file policy, a laudatory 
story about a prosecutor’s compliance with the policy to the 
office’s strategic disadvantage had entered office lore: Several 
different prosecutors recounted it independently. . . . Prosecutors 
told the story in the office to convey the importance of complying 
with the full disclosure policy, even at the cost of a conviction, 
because doing so furthers the office’s broader mission to do 
justice.
330
 
Such epic stories need to be told. But so too do stories that describe 
ethical behavior that is less visible—stories that highlight the normalcy and 
value of such acts. Because others’ unethical conduct is more noticeable 
than their ethical conduct,331 not highlighting routine ethical behavior can 
reinforce the perception that unethical behavior is more normal and 
                                                                                                                            
328. Treviño et al., supra note 65, at 967. 
329. Treviño et al., supra note 321, at 143. In contrast, when firms discourage discussion of 
ethical issues they may minimize any value that could otherwise have been produced by ethics 
training sessions or rules. “An oil company employee asked if he could bring an ethical problem 
to a meeting of divisional presidents. Their immediate response was, ‘If he wants to talk ethics, 
let him talk to a priest or a psychiatrist. The office is no place for it.’ Imagine what employees 
would think of a formal ethics/compliance program in such an environment.” Id. 
330. Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 324, at 281–82; see also Scott Killingsworth, 
Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance through Organizational Values and 
Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961 (2012) (discussing the relationships among 
communication, culture, and compliance). 
331. See generally supra note 276 (discussing the interpersonal ethics blind spot). 
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acceptable than it really is.332 And we have seen that attorneys may 
ultimately adjust their own values and practices to be consistent with what 
they incorrectly believe to be the norms of their peers.333 
These stories and discussions should communicate why ethical rules and 
practices are important—for example, that ethical behavior in the 
prosecutors’ office is important for due process reasons and to maintain the 
respect of the public. People seek to make decisions they can justify334—to 
themselves and to others—and are more likely to follow rules that they 
believe in and support, than they are to abide by those that they view as an 
imposition.335 
Respected role models within the organization can demonstrate that 
ethics are valued and how to successfully approach practice ethically.336 
Leaders who treat others in a fair and respectful manner, hold themselves to 
high and consistent ethical standards and communicate those standards to 
others, accept responsibility for their own errors, demonstrate ethical 
awareness and a commitment to ethics even while being concerned about 
business concerns, remain open to input and feedback, and hold others 
accountable for their ethical decisions contribute to an overall climate that 
                                                                                                                            
332. See, e.g., Michael E. Brown et al., Ethical Leadership: A Social Learning Perspective 
for Construct Development and Testing, 97 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 117, 120 (2005) (“[P]rivately or stoically carrying out ethical actions may be 
insufficient to focus attention on ethical conduct.”); see also Robert B. Cialdini, Descriptive 
Social Norms as Underappreciated Sources of Social Control, 72 PSYCHOMETRIKA 263, 263 
(2007). 
333. See supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text (discussing pluralistic ignorance). 
Entities may also encourage their attorneys to network with attorneys outside the firm with 
respect to ethics issues. While confidentiality concerns will prevent attorneys from sharing the 
details of a situation with others outside the firm, there may be ways, particularly in a high tech 
world, for attorneys to network to discuss ethics with one another anonymously. Kim, supra 
note 9, at 1074–75. 
334. See, e.g., Christopher K. Hsee, Jiao Zhang, Fang Yu & Yiheng Xi, Lay Rationalism 
and Inconsistency Between Predicted Experience and Decision, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 
257, 267 (2003); Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11, 14 (1993). Jury 
researchers have also found that providing an explanation of the reasons underlying a rule can 
help jurors comply with the requirements of the rule. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & 
Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the 
Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 557–59 (1992); Duane T. Wegener et al., Flexible 
Corrections of Juror Judgments: Implications for Jury Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 629, 646 (2000); Roselle L. Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury Instructions on the Fusion of 
Liability and Compensatory Damages, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 134–35 (2001). 
335. See supra notes 109–112. 
336. See Linda K. Treviño & Stuart A. Youngblood, Bad Apples in Bad Barrels: A Causal 
Analysis of Ethical Decision-Making Behavior, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 378, 382 (1990) 
(finding that vicarious reward influenced outcome expectancies which were associated with 
ethical decision making). See generally ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977). 
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values ethics.337 By modeling good ethical behavior, key figures in the 
organization will also help develop junior attorneys’ schemas for what it 
means to be a successful attorney.338 In this way, legal organizations can 
help their attorneys rid themselves of an image—shaped in part by images 
of lawyers in popular culture—of attorneys as unethical and replace that 
image with a more positive view of attorneys’ ethics. 
All those who are visible and credible within the organization must 
model ethical behavior and take seriously their role of transmitting ethical 
norms.339 They must both “‘walk the talk’ and ‘talk the walk’”—making 
sure that behavior is consistent with other messages about ethics.340 
In a highly competitive environment of intense focus on the 
bottom line, employees need to know that the executive leaders in 
their organization care about ethics at least as much as financial 
performance. An ethical leader makes it clear that strong bottom-
line results are expected, but only if they can be delivered in a 
highly ethical manner.
341
 
Ethical neutrality or silence is not sufficient. Role models need to 
publicly enact the organization’s ethical mission through their words and 
                                                                                                                            
337. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 332, at 120 (finding that ethical leadership is 
associated with outcomes such as a greater willingness to report unethical conduct); Mayer et 
al., supra note 323, at 3–7; Mitchell J. Neubert et al., The Virtuous Influence of Ethical 
Leadership Behavior: Evidence From the Field, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 157, 165–67 (2009); Linda 
K. Treviño et al., A Qualitative Investigation of Perceived Executive Ethical Leadership: 
Perceptions From Inside and Outside the Executive Suite, 56 HUM. REL. 5, 14, 18–20 (2003); 
Weaver et al., supra note 323, at 316; Wimbush & Shepard, supra note 319, at 642; see also 
Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 31, at 21 (reporting a meta-analysis that found that a strong 
ethical climate, including strong ethical role models, was associated with less unethical 
behavior); Marshall Schminke et al., The Effect of Leader Moral Development on Ethical 
Climate and Employee Attitudes, 97 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
135, 147 (2005). 
338. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (defining “schema”). 
339. See Brown et al., supra note 332, at 130; Michael E. Brown & Linda K. Treviño, 
Ethical Leadership: A Review and Future Directions, 17 LEADERSHIP Q. 595, 601–02 (2006) 
(suggesting importance of seeing “reinforcement of ethical behavior (i.e., ethical leaders get 
ahead, unethical leaders do not)”); see also Robert S. Rubin et al., Do Ethical Leaders Get 
Ahead? Exploring Ethical Leadership and Promotability, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 215, 223 (2010). 
Bar disciplinary authorities, too, have a role to play in communicating acceptable norms. See 
Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 739 
(2003) (“[W]hen rule violations that are visible or well-known go unsanctioned, such failure to 
prosecute undermines the professional standard as a credible threat. It encourages other lawyers 
to violate the particular standard or the codes as a whole.”). 
340. Michael E. Brown & Marie S. Mitchell, Ethical and Unethical Leadership: Exploring 
New Avenues for Future Research, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 583, 584 (2010) (also exploring the 
notion of “unethical leadership”). 
341. TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 318, at 166. 
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their actions, including criticizing, disciplining, or even firing those who do 
not act consistently with the ethical mission.342 When New York Governor 
Andrew Cuomo fired the director of the State Office of Emergency 
Management for deploying government workers to clear his personal 
driveway during Hurricane Sandy,343 Cuomo sent a strong message to all 
state employees that unethical self-dealing would not be tolerated. 
2. Educate About Ethics 
 On-going ethics education and self-evaluation are key elements of a 
culture that is open about ethics. Ethics training must make ethical 
standards clear and avoid sending mixed signals. Clear rules can result in 
more ethical behavior and more willingness to confront ethical 
misconduct.344 Organizations, however, need to go beyond teaching the 
Rules of Professional Conduct or other ethical rules and standards and 
acknowledge that most difficult ethical dilemmas arise when important 
principles conflict. Thus, just as when learning to write, negotiate, engage in 
trial practice, or conduct legal analysis, lawyers need to learn how to think 
about the problems they will encounter and acquire specific skills to address 
them.345 
Organizations should equip attorneys to stand firm in the face of ethical 
challenges by teaching them about the psychological factors that inform 
decision making processes and set the stage for ethical missteps. Effective 
training will also familiarize lawyers and their supervisors with potential 
indicia of ethical misconduct and should address the mechanisms for and 
                                                                                                                            
342. Id. at 292–303. 
343. Danny Hakim, Cuomo Fires Emergency Office Chief for Misusing Workers in 
Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at A15. 
344. See, e.g., Kaptein, supra note 317, at 924–25. One commentator has opined that 
military attorneys who were uncomfortable with the Military Commission Act adopted in the 
wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks were willing and able to speak out against it, even though they 
operated within the authoritative context of the military, because they had been trained so 
effectively to take responsibility for fair application of the law. McNeal, supra note 33, at 139. 
At the same time, clearer rules can make employees less likely to report the problem outside the 
organization. See Kaptein, supra note 319, at 924–25. 
345. Disciplinary authorities, too, ought to consider education about the psychology of 
ethics as a component of discipline or as part of a set of measures aimed at prevention. Common 
approaches to ethical violations include disbarment, suspension, reprimand, and ethics 
education. See generally A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY 
PROCEEDINGS (1979); Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1998). None of 
these responses adequately addresses the psychological susceptibilities that we identify here, 
nor are they likely to build ethical resilience. 
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benefits of reporting misconduct.346 Training can be used to help attorneys 
develop implementation intentions347 and to make explicit ethical 
commitments. To be effective, trainings need to avoid vague generalities 
and instead address the kinds of ethical issues that are most likely to arise in 
the particular settings. Focusing on actual issues that have come up in the 
organization in the past is one way to make the training more directly 
meaningful. 
Role playing may help make ethical temptations more concrete and 
allow opportunities for thinking about specific alternative responses. In 
addition, such practice can strengthen attorneys’ moral “muscles,” focus 
their attention on the need to exercise self-control at times of depletion, 
motivate them to do so, and, thus, increase their capacity to resist 
temptation.348 
One of us frequently asks law students to engage in a negotiation 
exercise as part of a class on negotiation ethics. Even though the students 
are primed to focus on ethical concerns (the very topic of the class is 
negotiation ethics and the relevant ethical rules and contract doctrines are 
assigned as reading prior to class), many students engage in conduct that 
their counterparts find problematic. Students on each side often lie or fail to 
disclose information that the other side believes is “material.” Whereas each 
side is often able to justify their conduct—explaining, for example, that the 
other side “didn’t ask,” or that their client did not want them to disclose the 
information—their opponents are typically outraged and feel they have been 
lied to. Exploring these reactions can help attorneys understand the 
consequences of their ability to justify their own conduct.349 
                                                                                                                            
346. Marcia P. Miceli et al., A Word to the Wise: How Managers and Policy-Makers Can 
Encourage Employees to Report Wrongdoing, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 385 (2009). 
347. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
348. While resisting unethical behavior may deplete capacity in the short term, it can be 
possible to strengthen it in the long term. See generally Roy F. Baumeister et al., The Strength 
Model of Self-Control, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 351 (2007); Mark Muraven et 
al., Longitudinal Improvement of Self-Regulation Through Practice: Building Self-Control 
Strength Through Repeated Exercise, 139 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 446 (1999); Martin S. Hagger et al., 
Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A Meta-Analysis, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
495 (2010).  
349. Ethics educators Linda Treviño and Katherine Nelson recommend an exercise that 
presents participants with ethical dilemmas related to their work that do not have clear answers. 
Participants discuss the problems in groups, present their course of action, are challenged by a 
devil’s advocate, and are scored on their responses. Participants can then appeal to a board of 
senior colleagues with whom they can discuss the problems. In addition to providing an 
opportunity to engage with each other about difficult ethical dilemmas, the exercise facilitates 
ethical communication between people at different levels of the organization, and by including 
senior colleagues on the “appeals board” signals that the conversations are worth having. 
TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 318, at 233–35. 
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Finally, the attitude organizations convey when conducting ethics 
training is critically important. To encourage a principled rather than an 
instrumental ethical culture,350 training should communicate the value of 
ethics and the principles underlying the relevant ethical requirements.351 
Organizations that convey that ethics training is a required inconvenience—
just a box to be checked on the CLE form or window dressing to be 
displayed for particular audiences—seriously diminish the value of the 
training. 
3. Encourage Learning From Mistakes 
The challenges of learning from ethical mistakes352 affect legal 
organizations as well as individual lawyers. One study of how ethics were 
handled in law firms found that “information regarding the nature of the 
problems or questions, and how they are resolved was rarely, if ever, fed 
back into the firm. Both associates and partners seemed unaware of the 
extent of reported (or unreported) problems, questions, or violations of 
ethical standards.”353 Yet, when there is no feedback, learning will suffer,354 
and this may lead to further deterioration in the entity’s ethical norms. 
The mindset with which one approaches mistakes can make a 
tremendous difference for the ability to learn from them. Specifically, those 
with a fixed mindset see mistakes as an indication of incompetence or 
stupidity, react to them with anger or depression, and therefore miss out on 
opportunities to learn and improve. But those with a growth mindset see 
mistakes as opportunities to learn how to do better.355 Thus, part of 
establishing an ethical culture is to inculcate a learning or growth 
orientation to dealing with mistakes—providing and embracing 
opportunities for self-criticism. 
In this vein, organizations may want to establish processes to help 
attorneys learn from ethical missteps. For example, consider how Penn 
State University hired former FBI Director Louis Freeh and his staff to 
conduct a report on Penn State officials’ response to the reports of child 
                                                                                                                            
350. See supra notes 326–327. 
351. See supra notes 326–327, 334–335. 
352. See supra Part III. 
353. Messikomer, supra note 14, at 760. 
354. See Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can 
Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 29 (1998). 
355. CAROL DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS 6–7 (2007). See also 
Julie A. Oseid & Stephen D. Easton, “And Bad Mistakes, I’ve Made  Few”: Sharing Mistakes 
to Mentor New Lawyers, __ ALBANY L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2337241. 
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abuse by Assistant Football Coach Jerry Sandusky. The resulting report 
found that Penn State officials had made numerous missteps and suggested 
that specific reforms be made to avoid such lapses in the future.356 While not 
all organizations can afford—nor do all issues require—such a large-scale 
investigation, organizations would be well advised to appropriately explore 
what led an attorney to overstate her hours, borrow trust fund money, omit 
crucial information from a filing, or fail to consider evidence of a 
defendant’s innocence. 
4. Protect Attorneys From Cognitive, Temporal, and Financial 
Stresses 
Cognitive and temporal overloads tend to increase the likelihood that 
attorneys will engage in unethical conduct.357 Although some of these 
stresses seem inherent to many legal jobs, their connection to ethical 
problems should give firms an incentive to provide attorneys with sufficient 
support staff, effective software, and office systems and structures to help 
prevent and catch problems.358 Firms can also strive to treat their attorneys 
humanely, and to schedule work in a reasonable fashion. Even providing 
exercise opportunities to employees359 may pay ethical dividends. While all 
of these steps have costs, so too do ethical mistakes. 
                                                                                                                            
356. Brad Wolverton, Penn State’s Culture of Reverence Led to ‘Total Disregard’ for 
Children’s Safety, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 12, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/Penn-
States-Culture-of/132853; see also, e.g., Terry Frieden, Fast and Furious Report Finds DOJ 
Management Failures, CNN.COM (Sept. 19, 2012, 2:13 PM), 
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/19/fast-and-furious-report-finds-doj-management-failures 
(describing DOJ report about a year-long investigation that uncovered widespread failures at the 
BATF); cf. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level 
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-
mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html (describing how Wal-Mart executives shut down 
an investigation that started to “unearth[] evidence of widespread bribery” in Mexico). 
357. See supra Part II.D. 
358. For example, firms can provide systems for screening and dealing with conflicts of 
interest. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 289–307 (describing firms without systems or 
using systems that rely on lawyer memory to catch conflicts). Relying on memory to flag 
conflicts is fraught with peril. Id. at 344; see also Kaptein, supra note 319, at 925 (identifying 
“feasibility” as a dimension of ethical culture—“unethical conduct occurred when employees 
lacked adequate or sufficient time, budgets, equipment, information, and authority to fulfill their 
responsibilities”). 
359. See, e.g., Workplace Health Promotion: Physical Activity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/implementation/topics/physical-activity.html 
(describing benefits of providing exercise opportunities to employees) (last visited Oct. 25, 
2013). 
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Even when it proves impractical to limit cognitive and temporal stresses, 
organizations should urge their attorneys to do those tasks that involve 
ethical challenges when they are most fresh, rather than most depleted. 
Whenever they face tasks that afford opportunities to cheat, 
managers may benefit by scheduling these tasks when they are 
fresh and well rested (e.g., not after a long flight). Similarly, 
managers may benefit from arranging tasks to reduce the 
likelihood that their employees will face ethical decisions when 
their self-regulatory resources are depleted.
360
 
Firms can also take steps to relieve the economic pressures that may lead 
attorneys to cross ethical lines. While organizations cannot fully protect 
their attorneys from financial problems, they may be able to provide 
financial counseling, short term low interest loans,361 or information on how 
to access other sources of psychological or financial assistance (such as 
through a local bar association). 
5. Structure Rewards to Encourage Ethical Behavior 
Organizations should do what they can to reward conduct that promotes 
ethics362 and to judge decisions based on the quality of the underlying 
decision making process rather than solely on the ultimate outcomes.363 In 
other words, firms need to figure out ways to reward attorneys who engage 
in the kinds of conduct and decision making processes that are most likely 
to lead to the most effective and ethical strategies. While it may be more 
difficult to look beyond hours, wins, and fees to assess lawyering, it is 
important to avoid rewarding unethical attorneys. 
                                                                                                                            
360. Gino et al., supra note 181, at 200. When depleted, attorneys can do their best to 
revive themselves by taking a rest, having a snack, going for a short walk, or meditating. 
361. See Levin, supra note 17, at 387 (advising that firms should “try to limit the situations 
in which lawyers are overwhelmed by their financial circumstances or case loads and to provide 
for more outside support for handling these situations when they arise”). 
362. See Kim supra note 9, at 1053 (suggesting companies regulate compensation to 
decrease self-interest); John M. Darley, The Dynamics of Authority Influence in Organizations 
and the Unintended Action Consequences, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 195, at 40 (“[I]ncentive systems have an elevated status for 
communicating what the organization ‘really wants’ and ‘really values.’ In a world in which 
talk is regarded as cheap, bonuses, promotions, and other tangible marks of valuing are what 
really matter.”); John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in 
CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 254, at 25 
(“Corporations that put in place a corporate ethics code and do not consider its relationship to 
existing corporate practices and bonus and promotion systems seem to me to be engaging in 
window dressing of a particularly cynical sort.”). 
363. Baron & Hershey, supra note 83, at 574. 
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Consider the positive messages sent in the following environment: 
One CEO of a financial services firm was very serious about 
identifying and rewarding people who lived his organization’s 
values. He challenged his executives to bring him stories of 
employees who were doing the right things in the right way, who 
were models of the culture. He collected these stories and sent 
personal, handwritten thank-you notes to those model employees. 
While a phone call might have sufficed, employees were so 
thrilled with his written recognition and praise that they displayed 
his notes in their offices. Those framed notes sent a rather loud 
message to other employees about what kind of behavior was 
valued at high levels. Of course, they also helped spread word of 
the ‘heroes’ and their deeds.364 
Consider also the messages sent by a firm that provides attorneys with a 
pay bonus for billing 1,800 hours, and an even greater bonus for billing 
each additional 1,000 hours. Such an incentive scheme is likely to tempt 
even the most ethical of attorneys to round up her hours, double-bill a few 
hours to multiple clients, or perhaps “borrow” some hours from a future 
billing period. Or, consider a prosecutor’s office that provides kudos or 
promotions to those prosecutors with the highest conviction rates. While 
these practices can be defended as encouraging “hard work,” it is clear that 
they can also incentivize unethical conduct. Entities that take the trouble to 
reward attorneys based on a broader set of accomplishments will likely be 
repaid with more ethical work habits.365 
6. Encourage Ethical Reporting 
No matter how hard organizations try to prevent unethical conduct, 
lapses may occur and will need to be addressed. Understanding the thought 
processes that decision makers go through before reporting an ethical 
violation can help organizations identify the measures that they can take to 
ensure that employees will make reports of ethical misconduct when 
appropriate. A potential reporter must: 
                                                                                                                            
364. TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 318, at 181–82. 
365. See Kirkland, supra note 236, at 615 (quoting Interview with General Counsel No. 4, 
at 38 (2007–2008) (on file with author)) (“[describing reports of] statistics collected by 
malpractice insurers that show a correlation between firms’ compensation systems and firm risk 
profiles. One general counsel explained, ‘The liability insurers will tell you the closer you are to 
a ‘lock step’ compensation system, the safer your profile. The closer you are to an ‘eat what you 
kill’ system the riskier the profile—the greater the number of claims.’”); see also John M. 
Darley, Setting Standards Seeks Control, Risks Distortion, 32 PUB. AFF. REP. 3, 5 (1991) 
(describing the distorting effects of criterial-control systems).  
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(1) recognize that a violation has occurred; 
(2) decide that the infraction warrants intervention; 
(3) decide that the observer is responsible for taking action on the 
matter; 
(4) identify what responsive actions are available; and 
(5) conclude that the benefits of reporting the violation outweigh the 
costs.366 
Measures that take these steps into account are likely to be most effective 
in encouraging reporting. For example, ethical training and culture can help 
attorneys recognize that an ethical violation has occurred and warrants 
intervention.367 In addition, organizations can make clear that ensuring 
organization-wide ethical compliance is part of attorneys’ job 
responsibilities and will benefit the organization.368 Attorneys may hesitate 
to “tattle” on their peers if they feel they are stepping outside their role, but 
will more likely report problems if such reporting is considered part of their 
job, and if they know that reporting is designed to benefit the 
organization.369 
Organizations can also encourage attorneys to raise ethics issues by 
providing specific and multiple channels through which individuals can 
dissent and raise questions.370 Multiple channels for reporting allow 
employees to choose one with which they are comfortable.371 As one 
possible reporting channel, some large firms now have outside or in-house 
ethics counsel, an ethics committee, or an ethics ombudsperson who can 
                                                                                                                            
366. See Marcia P. Miceli et al., Who Blows the Whistle and Why?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 113, 115 (1991); aee also Michael E. Roloff & Gaylen D. Paulson, Confronting 
Organizational Transgressions, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 195, at 57–60 (dividing the preconfrontation process into “Sense-
Making” and “Action Formation”). 
367. See supra Section IV.B.2 (discussing appropriate ethical training). 
368. Employees are more likely to report perceived ethical problems internally when they 
view such reporting as part of their assigned role. Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus & Chockalingam 
Viswesvaran, Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of 
Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 277, 286 (2005); Marcia 
Parmerlee Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationships Among Beliefs, Organizational Position, 
and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27 ACAD. MGMT. J. 687, 696 (1984); see 
also Miceli et al., supra note 366, at 123; Linda Klebe Treviño & Bart Victor, Peer Reporting of 
Unethical Behavior: A Social Context Perspective, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 38, 47 (1992); Bart 
Victor et al., Peer Reporting of Unethical Behavior: The Influence of Justice Evaluations and 
Social Context Factors, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 258 (1993). 
369. Victor et al., supra note 368, at 258. 
370. Kurt Lewin, Group Decision and Social Change, in READINGS IN SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 330 (Guy E. Swanson et al. eds., 1952) (focusing on shaping behavior by using 
channel factors—relatively minor changes in the relevant situation—that can have a significant 
influence on behavior by leading or “channeling” people in a particular direction). 
371. Miceli et al., supra note 346, at 388. 
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serve this role.372 While lawyers in such a role may share some incentives 
with others in the firm,373 they may be more removed from the immediate 
pressures of at least some ethical situations. Because such counsel will not 
be directly involved with the client, case, or deal at issue, she may be more 
objective than the attorney directly affected and thus less tempted to counsel 
unethical actions.374 For example, when exploring a potential conflict of 
interest, ethics counsel can consider the matter as a part of the firm’s 
interests and larger book of business rather than leaving the decision to the 
attorney for whom the potential conflict may represent significant new 
business.375 In addition, consulting ethics counsel can be designated as an 
accepted part of the entity’s practice and the attorney’s role.376 
Organizations must not only provide the channels for reporting, but also 
ensure that reporting leads to outcomes that are perceived to be appropriate. 
When employees believe that their ethical reports are likely to be taken 
seriously, they are more likely to make such reports.377 While organizations 
will have to find a balance between treating reports of real wrongdoing 
seriously and not “rewarding the gadfly or chronic low performer seeking to 
                                                                                                                            
372. See generally Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics 
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 559 (2002); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 1515 (2005–2006); Jonathan D. Glater, In a Complex World, Even Lawyers 
Need Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/03/business/in-a-
complex-world-even-lawyers-need-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
373. Kirkland, supra note 70, at 188, 192 (explaining that “ethics counsel see their jobs as 
finding ways to take on as much new work as they can without running afoul of the ethics rules” 
and that they “struggle to find ways to say yes even when there is a conflict”); Suchman, supra 
note 101, at 864 (describing interview with lawyer at a firm at which the “ethics committee” 
was called the “No Business Committee”). 
374. Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers are Different and Why We are the Same: Creating 
Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical Behavior—In-House Ethics 
Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 704 (2011). 
375. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 363–64. Ethics counsel who are compensated 
directly for their special role tend to take the position more seriously and see it as less 
burdensome than do those ethics counsel who are asked to do the job on top of their other 
duties. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 372, at 572–73. Because attorneys are subject to 
group pressures and may become committed to positions they have taken, fresh perspectives can 
be helpful. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 113 (suggesting rotating personnel as a means to 
encourage more ethical behavior). 
376. Rotunda, supra note 374, at 706. 
377. Miceli et al., supra note 346, at 388–89 (employees are less likely to report perceived 
ethical problems if they don’t think anything will or can be done to rectify the problem); see 
also Kaptein, supra note 319, at 927 (finding that “sanctionability” is positively associated with 
confrontation of unethical behavior and reporting to management and negatively related to 
external whistleblowing). 
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distract attention, . . . [or] wasting time on frivolous complaints,”378 it is 
important to investigate claims fully and fairly. 
When the organization finds a complaint to be legitimate, it should take 
prompt action to address the concern and communicate that action to the 
reporter. This action should focus not only on any “bad apples” who have 
acted unethically, but also on correcting any systemic problems.379 
Sometimes it will also be appropriate to publicize instances in which 
reporting led to positive change, while at the same time being careful to 
protect confidentiality and not to spark retaliation. Providing feedback to 
reporting attorneys about the actions taken also encourages continued 
reporting. 
A client did not want to disclose a particular document; instead, he 
wanted to get rid of it. I told the senior associate, and he told me 
that the partners did not want to know about it. However, I did not 
like that result. I wrote a legal memorandum politely describing 
the problem and discussing the case law requiring us to turn over 
the document. I sent it to the partners who promptly overruled the 
senior associate and turned over the document. Later, one of the 
partners called me in his office and thanked me for what I had 
done. “We could have gotten into a problem over that,” he said. 
The partner was promoting the right culture.
380
 
When the organization ultimately finds that a report was not well 
founded, it is equally important to provide feedback to the attorney reporter. 
This feedback should include clarifying what conduct is unethical and what 
conduct the company believes should be reported.381  
Finally, it is also important to assure attorneys that they will be protected 
rather than punished for reporting possible ethical issues.382 Fear of 
retaliation reduces the likelihood of internal reporting.383 It is not that people 
“expect or want a reward for doing the right thing. They just don’t want to 
be punished for it.”384 Of course, it is critically important to ensure that the 
protections that organizations provide to attorneys are “real” and not just 
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window dressing that is ignored when promotion, compensation, and 
retention decisions are made.385 
Certain employees may be more likely to report perceived ethical 
problems than others. For example, employees are more likely to report 
ethical problems internally when they have greater commitment to their job, 
higher job satisfaction,386 and feel they are treated fairly.387 Thus, 
organizations that are interested in encouraging ethical reporting by their 
attorneys will also want to focus more generally on their attorneys’ 
workplace satisfaction. Because more junior employees are generally less 
likely to report perceived ethical problems, organizations may want to focus 
on helping these more junior attorneys recognize what misconduct needs to 
be reported, understand the organization’s commitment to ethics, know how 
to report,388 and feel secure in reporting ethical issues. More junior 
employees are likely to feel more vulnerable and, thus, may need greater 
assurances.389 
7. Monitor Ethics 
Finally, organizations can and indeed are required to take steps to 
monitor the ethical performance of their attorney employees.390 Given the 
very human ways in which people can fall prey to ethical temptations, 
entities should not assume that attorneys are behaving ethically, but should 
instead develop systems to provide checks on behavior—whether by using 
software to monitor billing patterns, having colleagues double-check what 
discovery or due diligence is produced, reviewing how attorneys conduct 
negotiations, or monitoring how attorneys prepare their clients for 
depositions or trial. It is most important to monitor situations in which 
attorneys, due to cognitive or temporal depletion or structural temptations, 
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are most likely to engage in ethical misconduct.391 As noted earlier, when 
ethical improprieties are found, organizations should discipline attorneys 
found to have behaved inappropriately, determine whether systemic 
changes should be made, and provide appropriate feedback to the 
community. 
While structural systems to monitor ethical performance are perhaps 
necessary, research has found that intrinsic motives, identification with the 
rules of the organization, and believing that the organization is legitimate 
tend to have a greater effect on rule following (and a commitment to 
following the rules) than do perceptions of the likelihood of detection and 
the nature of the likely sanctions.392 Thus, even as they build systems to help 
attorneys avoid missteps, organizations should act in ways—enacting fair 
processes and treating attorneys fairly—that help attorneys see the entity as 
legitimate and as embodying values that are congruent with their own.393 Of 
particular importance are providing opportunities for input into 
organizational policies, making decisions in a neutral fashion using 
transparent and objective criteria, making decisions that treat people 
consistently and respectfully, and providing explanations for decisions 
reached.394 Developing such procedures can reap a variety of benefits: 
First, in a culture where transparent procedures are 
voluntarily embraced, the self-policing mechanisms that will 
thrive in the organization will be more likely to expose 
wrongdoing in its infancy. . . Second, a culture in which rule-
following is the expected norm and cynicism is low will be a far 
less comfortable environment for those who would prefer to break 
the rules. And finally, in a culture in which rule-following is the 
accepted norm, scoundrels and cheats will be far less likely to 
ascend to the positions of power in which they can do significant 
damage.
395
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V. CONCLUSION 
“[T]o understand all is not to forgive all . . . [b]ut . . . to 
understand all may well put us on guard against doing the 
unforgivable.”396 
While research into the psychology of legal ethics is ongoing,397 current 
knowledge can help individual attorneys and organizations employing those 
attorneys resist the pull of unethical behavior. Having learned that 
“[a]ttributing blame solely to flawed individuals or corrupt organizations 
rarely captures the subtleties of how ethical misconduct occurs,” and instead 
“offers false reassurance that only moral deviants, not ordinary people, 
engage in such behavior,”398 we are better equipped to fight against the slide 
into misconduct. 
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